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Note from the editor
Dear reader, 
Here is the Summer 2007 edition of the European Eco-
nomic Sociology Newsletter. Most of the contributions in 
this issue focus on finance, a topic that has garnered a lot 
of attention by economic sociologists and scholars from 
other fields alike. Besides recommending all of the pieces 
in this issue for their stimulating content, I want to also say 
how pleased I am that the issue includes contributions by 
many women scholars. This was not an explicit intention 
on my part but I do consider it a significant reflection of 
how the field has progressed over the years. 
I invited one of the key figures in sociology of financial 
markets, Karin Knorr Cetina (University of Konstanz and 
University of Chicago), to provide a lead editorial on the 
issue’s focus. Professor Knorr Cetina generously responded 
to the invitation and wrote a stimulating piece on whether 
economic sociology and sociology of finance are signifi-
cantly distinct as fields of inquiry, arguing that indeed they 
are different, along four lines, with diverse goals and dif-
ferent histories. 
In the core of the issue, you will find empirical contribu-
tions from some very recent research in the economic 
sociology of finance, highlighting the role of social em-
beddedness, institutionalization and technological founda-
tions. 
Alya Guseva (Boston University) reports some findings from 
her forthcoming book on the creation of mass consumer 
finance markets in Russia, pointing to the critical role of 
networks that span two levels of analysis connecting or-
ganizations and individual actors. 
Brooke Harrington (Brown University and MPIfG) provides 
a brief summary of research  reported in her book Pop 
Finance: Investment Clubs and Stock Market Populism 
(forthcoming from Princeton University Press), on the 
“American investment craze of the 1990s,” documenting 
the socially embedded activities of investor clubs, where 
retail investors pool their money to invest in the stock mar-
ket. 
Sabine Montagne (Université Paris-Dauphine) shares in-
sights from her research on the American Pension Funds, 
uncovering the origins of the contemporary beliefs in the 
virtues of pension funds, and the legal transformation of 
the trust that contributed to the legitimization of finance. 
Alex Preda (University of Edinburgh) turns our attention to 
the technological underpinnings of financial markets, ex-
amining the role price-recording technologies played in the 
constitution of a national securities market in the U.S., and 
how they came to affect transaction rules  and roles. 
I am also extremely pleased that Viviana Zelizer, one of the 
foremost experts in economic sociology, has agreed to 
share some of her thoughts on the field by responding to 
ten interview questions. I am sure that readers will find 
much food for thought and research ideas from her in-
sightful responses. 
As in previous issues we also assembled reviews of several 
new publications of interest to economic sociologists, which 
appear in the “Read and Recommended” section contrib-
uted by Olivier Godechot (Ecole Normale Supérieure), as well 
as in four book reviews on the topics of trust, transnational 
governance, economic sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, and 
organizational transformations of American manufactur-
ing. 
We also continue the section on doctoral dissertations, and 
report projects on themes as diverse as interlocking direc-
torates, transformation of state-owned economy, socially 
responsible investments, and hi-tech marketing. If you are 
nearing the completion of your doctorate or have recently 
defended your dissertation, please consider sending in your 
summary! 
The academic year 2006-07 is behind us and this is the 
final issue of EESN Volume 8. It is also my final issue as 
Editor. I am delighted that Patrik Aspers (University of 
Stockholm and MPIfG) has agreed to serve in this capacity 
for Volume 9. In line with the interdisciplinary spirit that 
we have tried to foster, Patrik's goals include devoting 
attention to fields like economic anthropology, business 
studies, economic geography and the like, in order to 
make the research in these related fields more familiar to 
economic sociologists. This is an excellent agenda and I 
wish Patrik a lot of success as Editor. 
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Finally, allow me to express my gratitude to almost fifty 
people who contributed to Volume 8, to the Editorial 
Board for their support, and to Christina Glasmacher at 
MPIfG who has assured the smooth production. Last but 
certainly not least, thanks go to all of you, readers/ sub-
scribers, who now number more than 1300, and come 
from places well beyond Europe and North America, in-
cluding Africa, Middle East, Oceania, and Latin America.  
Keep reading, consider contributing, and encourage your 
colleagues and/ or students to sign up for a free delivery of 
EESN to their email boxes, at   
http://econsoc.mpifg.de/newsletter/newsletter_subscription.asp ! 
With best wishes for a wonderful Summer, and beyond, 
Nina Bandelj 
nbandelj@uci.edu
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Economic Sociology and the Sociology of Finance. 
Four Distinctions, Two Developments, One Field? 
Karin Knorr Cetina 
University of Chicago and University of Konstanz 
knorr@uchicago.edu , karin.knorr@uni-konstanz.de  
 
Are there significant distinctions between economic sociol-
ogy and the sociology of finance?1 Are such differences 
anchored in existence, do they have something to do, that 
is, with how the economy and finance function and are 
articulated in the contemporary world? In this paper I con-
tend that we do indeed witness the branching off of two 
distinctive fields which, surprisingly perhaps, do not have a 
common history or origin. In other words, the study of 
finance and financial markets as we see it happen now is 
not simply an outgrowth of the new economic sociology 
that emerged since the 1980s. Nor has economic sociology 
in general with its long history and several ups and downs 
developed in a way that makes the turn to finance the 
logical next step for it to take. Two systems that co-exist 
may have overlaps and become coupled. Some researchers 
have, during their lifetime, contributed to both areas. Max 
Weber wrote an early, recently republished, astute essay 
on the stock exchange, though most of his work tackles 
larger and more general issues summarized in Economy 
and Society (2000 [1894]). Baker applied network concepts 
to securities markets at the onset of the new economic 
sociology (1981, 1984), and Zelizer’s recent work on cir-
cuits of commerce (2005) is an attempt to develop a unify-
ing concept that potentially serves both areas. Yet most 
scholars that have long made distinguished contributions 
to economic sociology remain concerned with the founda-
tional issues of their field – the phenomena of embedded-
ness, of networks and interfirm relationships, of producer 
markets, and of the role of culture in economies and cor-
porations. And most studies of finance do not pursue these 
lines of reasoning but rather develop fresh concepts and 
ideas that draw on outside areas in their theoretical analy-
ses. 
What are some of the core differences between economic 
sociology and the sociology of finance and how are they 
motivated? In the following, I offer four arguments de-
signed to capture and account for some of the distinctions 
between these areas. 
First difference: Unlike the recent sociology of finance, 
economic sociology has focused on producer markets and 
the production side of the economy. Let me begin with a 
bit of history. According to a wealth of statistics, finance 
has risen in importance in the last quarter century more 
rapidly than any other sector of the economy. Since it 
bottomed out in 1982, the US stock market experienced its 
most dramatic increases in prices in history when long term 
data from 1871 to 2000 are considered, and large stock 
price increases also occurred in Europe, Asia and Australia. 
In the period between 1981 and 1986 alone the volume of 
US public bond issues rose at an annual rate of 37%, equity 
issues almost tripled, the dollar volume of mergers and ac-
quisitions activity tripled, and the volume of international 
bonds multiplied fivefold (Eccles and Crane 1988: 1). There 
were since then several readjustments of the spiking of 
prices and activities (examples are the ‘Black Monday’ of 
October 19, 1987 when the Dow Jones Industrial Average 
dropped 508 points, and the market decline in 2001 and 
2002). Nonetheless, the level and diversity of financial 
activities appears to have increased significantly since the 
1980s. More importantly, perhaps, awareness of the finan-
cial system, of the risks and benefits it offers to individuals 
and organizations, has also risen. As Sassen shows (e.g. 
2005), the stock of financial assets has increased three 
times faster than the aggregate GDP of the 23 highly de-
veloped OECD countries since 1980, and the volume of 
trading in currencies, stocks and bonds has increased five 
times faster. Most of this activity is financial market activity. 
For example, the global foreign direct investment stock 
was US$ 6 trillion in 2000, while the worldwide value of 
internationally traded derivatives was over $US 80 trillion 
and rose to US$ 192 trillion in 2002. The largest financial 
market in terms of volume of transactions, foreign ex-
change transactions, were ten times as large as world 
trade in 1983 (the economic exchange of goods and ser-
vices), but 70 times larger in 1999, even though world 
trade also grew sharply during this period (Sassen 2005). 
Financial markets, then, have experienced an unprece-
dented rise since the early 1980s, and their power to de-
termine outcomes in production, consumption and social 
welfare is now enormous.2 Yet they have not found much 
attention in sociology. This is surprising in light of the 
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sharp upturn economic sociology has taken during the 
same period and the pioneering work that has happened 
since (e.g. Granovetter 1985; Zelizer 1985; Burt 1983; 
Fligstein 2001; Podolny 2001; Dobbin 1994; White 2002). 
Why the relative inattention? One answer surely is that the 
new economic sociology has defined its territory in a way 
that seems more attuned to the production side of the 
economy than to finance. Economists have circumscribed 
economic activities as that set of pursuits which involves 
the use of scarce resources to satisfy some human needs or 
wants – and they have broadly classified these activities 
into the categories of production, consumption and ex-
change (Dholakia and Oza 1996: 7). Economic sociology 
also defined economic behavior in these terms – in terms 
of the institutions and relations of production, consump-
tion and social distribution (e.g. DiMaggio 1994: 28; Smel-
ser and Swedberg 1994: 3; Portes 1995: 3). In their re-
search, economic sociologists have focused on the produc-
tion side of the economy, taking the firm as their point of 
departure – in line with the distinctive role production has 
played in the discipline’s understanding of capitalism and 
with the focus early economic sociologists placed on the 
internal working of organizations (Swedberg 1991; Car-
ruthers and Uzzi 2000: 486). Though a number of early 
studies were concerned with financial markets (Smith 
1981; Baker 1984; Adler and Adler 1984), most recent 
research has not been in this area but has involved a shift 
from what goes on within firms to what goes on between 
them. The dominant line of research specializes in the 
analysis of interorganizational ties, in effect joining organ-
izational analysis and market analysis through the use of 
network approaches that inspiringly analyze the nature of 
the relationships and networks and how these affect labor, 
product and credit-seeking (e.g. Baker 1990; Burt 1993; 
Bandelj 2002; Baker et al. 1998; DiMaggio and Louch 
1998; Uzzi 1999; Uzzi and Lancaster 2004). When markets 
are analyzed they tend to be producer markets, e.g. mar-
kets for industrial products and non-financial services. 
Interestingly, economic sociology in Europe until recently 
also set aside financial markets, focusing instead on macro-
issues of the economy. Current research appears particu-
larly concerned with the transformation of the welfare 
state and its social consequences, changing economic 
policies, varieties of capitalism and the like (e.g. Hall and 
Soskice 2001; Deutschmann 2002; Streeck and Yamamura 
2003; Beckert 2006).3 Both the new economic sociology 
that thrived in the US and European economic sociology 
with its more industrial, macro-economic and political 
concerns also neglected consumption, an area that devel-
oped into a special subfield of sociology within the ASA.4
The new economic sociology in the US also emerged from 
a new engagement of neoclassical economics that moved 
away from the “truce” between economics and sociology 
Parsons is said to have negotiated earlier (see Swedberg 
2003: 33), a truce that gave economics the core economic 
matters and sociology the contextual and peripheral 
things. Granovetter, we all know, attacked neoclassical 
economics for wrongly assuming “atomized” decision 
making by individual economic actors. He proposed the 
opposite – decision making was embedded in networks of 
social relationships that should be studied to correct neo-
classical and related models. This proposal did indeed open 
up the “virgin lake” and “goldmine” of solvable research 
questions that Granovetter foresaw (cited in Swedberg 
2003: 35). But the focus on embeddedness, in its narrow 
as well as in its broader definition (as cultural, political and 
social embeddedness [Barber 1995]), left the core financial 
activities untouched. More precisely, research in economic 
sociology glossed over distinctions between different kinds 
of economic action and particularly between producer 
markets and financial markets in an effort to address the 
question how activities are embedded in social structure. 
Research has treated financial markets as implicated in 
firm’s behavior and as outcomes of firm-bank relations, 
but the focus of the analysis remained the firm or the in-
dustry rather than the stock exchange and trading floor 
(see Keister [2002] for a summary of this literature). While 
this research does not reject differences between markets, 
it is also not designed to capture the types and patterns of 
social structural and cultural variation that a “multiple mar-
ket”– model postulated early in economic sociology (Zelizer 
1988; see also Mirowski 2002: 539) suggests. Yet some of 
these differences, for example that between producer mar-
kets and financial markets, are consequential for almost 
every level of analysis of markets. 
Second difference: Finance and production are two distinc-
tive areas of activities and need to be differentiated in 
research. Financial markets are not primarily concerned 
with the production of goods or with their distribution to 
clients, but with the trading of financial instruments not 
designed for consumption. No “production” effort on the 
traders’ part is involved in “spot” transactions, the direct 
sale or buying of a financial instrument. When more com-
plex instruments are traded (options, futures, etc.), their 
value tends to be calculated on the spot by traders them-
selves without recourse to production facilities. Financial 
markets belong to a second order economy in which 
“goods” are contracts that circulate rather than become 
channeled to end consumers. These goods (financial in-
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struments) are abstract entities which may not even be 
pieces of paper but merely an entry in the books of rele-
vant parties; the value of these entities is determined by 
financial market activities and is only tenuously related to 
the underlying referent (e.g. a company). The shift from 
concrete funds to abstract entities epitomizes the decoup-
ling of financial markets from the ordinary economy of 
production, consumption and exchange. 
The second aspect of this decoupling has to do with the 
forms of action prevalent in financial markets, which are 
investment and “speculation.” Consider the example of 
the foreign exchange market where “actuals” (currencies) 
rather than contracts are traded in spot transactions. His-
torically, currency dealers provided services for importers, 
exporters, and others who needed foreign exchange to pay 
bills and pay for goods. They were intermediaries in con-
ventional trading oriented to the transfer of goods from 
producers to consumers. But only a tiny percentage of the 
current daily trading volume in foreign exchange (about 
1.2 trillion US dollars in 2001; BIS 2002) reflects “real” 
requirements of companies; the daily volume of dollar 
transactions in this market is approximately 200 times 
larger than the added volume of US merchandise imports 
and exports, plus other sales that require foreign exchange 
(e.g. Caves et al. 1999: 420). Thus, most foreign exchange 
dealing today is speculation not motivated by needs for the 
product obtained but by the motive to gain from expected 
price changes of the currency when it is resold. Speculation 
and the seemingly endless circulation of the entities traded 
also differentiate other financial markets not only from 
producer markets but also from merchandise and service 
trading, which is oriented toward the transportation of 
goods from one location to another and toward consump-
tion at the end of the trading chain. Theoretically speaking, 
financial markets appear to be internally differentiated, 
complex self-referential systems whose functioning, forms 
of action, and other mechanisms pose questions in their 
own right – quite apart from the aggregate consequences 
these markets have on economies and corporations. There 
is, in Granovetter’s language, another virgin lake before us 
(not fully untouched, of course - see the early studies of 
these markets cited above) that warrants fishing expedi-
tions by social scientists. It is this discovery project that I 
think the sociology of finance and financial markets has 
embarked on. 
There is a third reason for the decoupling of financial mar-
kets and producer markets: their separate historical devel-
opment. According to some historians, the emergence of 
financial markets was not simply part of industrialization 
but preceded and then enhanced production-based capi-
talist developments (e.g. Rousseau and Sylla 1999). More 
recently, financial markets became de-synchronized from 
the global system of production through successive waves 
of liberalization of capital flows and financial services from 
the control of individual nation states (see the overview in 
Swary and Topf 1992). For example, the removal of barri-
ers between national financial markets, particularly cur-
rency markets in the last decades of the 20th century, 
enabled the emergence of a system in which economists 
consider frictions and impediments to be minor and which 
appears in fact beyond the control of any regulatory struc-
ture. Production systems remain more deeply embedded in 
national regulatory environments that affect many aspects 
of the workforce they require, e.g. the plants, the equip-
ment, the ecological aspects of production, among others. 
The historical uncoupling manifests itself in the transforma-
tion effects of financial capitalism on industrial capitalism 
and the political system. As we know, capital markets have 
become major funding alternatives to banks as a source of 
debt financing for industrial corporations, with conse-
quences for employees’ compensation, now frequently 
including stock options, which shifts the power from man-
agers to shareholders (e.g. Fligstein 2001: ch. 7; Zorn et al. 
2005), and changes in the structure of accounting, among 
others. In the US and UK, less than 30% of corporate fi-
nance came from commercial banks before the turn of the 
century (Chernow 1997). The system has also shown a 
considerable tendency for internal expansion, evolution 
and intensification – of instruments, trading strategies, 
professional roles, and so on. Financial markets have been 
a laboratory and breeding ground not only for the creation 
and proliferation of financial instruments but also for the 
“intensification of finance” (Bryan and Farrell 1996) that 
manifests itself in the dramatic rises in trading volume and 
cross-border investment. The uncoupling can also be 
gleaned from the role currency markets play as an inde-
pendent power in testing and determining the value of 
currencies against the authority of central banks and gov-
ernments. This illustrates the more general role of some 
financial markets as external observers and evaluators of 
national macroeconomic policies that are signaled in eco-
nomic indicators and exchange rates. 
Third difference: In contrast to economic sociology, the 
sociology of finance needs new concepts to understand 
finance and financial markets as complex systems in their 
own right. The sociology of finance and financial markets 
took off since the late 1990s, with publications increasingly 
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appearing in English, French and German since the turn of 
the century (see among others Mars 1998; Callon 1998; 
Preda 2001, 2006; Miller 2002; Knorr Cetina and Bruegger 
2002); Muniesa 2003; MacKenzie and Millo, 2003; Zaloom 
2003, 2006; Knorr Cetina 2003; Kalthoff 2004; Godechot 
2005; Hassoun 2005; Beunza and Stark 2005; Windolf 
2005; McKenzie 2006; Staeheli 2007). Institutional efforts 
centered on the field (e.g. specialized conferences, journals 
and research groups studying financial markets) also ap-
peared since that time. However, unlike the new economic 
sociology for which Granovetter provided a road map and 
supplied a theoretical framework (and pointed out a 
methodology – network analysis), the recent sociology of 
finance starts not from a paradigm but from a set of open 
questions. How can we define an activity like speculation? 
How did this activity become historically differentiated 
from gambling with which it was once identified? What is 
the architecture of financial markets? Is there a level of 
sociality in markets that are assumed to be models of eco-
nomic efficiency and the outcome of anonymous activities 
by atomistic actors? And how do we deal with some of the 
most distinctive features of these markets, their knowledge 
and information base, their complex technological under-
pinning and their global character? Financial markets do 
lend themselves to extensions of embeddedness analyses, 
as Baker’s (1984) early network analyses show, but they 
also pose more general questions that appear urgent in 
light of these markets’ functioning as driving factors and 
iconic elements of a postindustrial and global world. More-
over, network forms of coordination were at times deliber-
ately bred out of financial markets with the help of technol-
ogy (Knorr Cetina 2003) – yet this does not mean that 
these markets are not in other ways social and cultural 
forms. While it will be necessary to learn from the em-
beddedness-paradigm and to apply it where appropriate, it 
is also necessary to draw on the larger toolbox of socio-
logical concepts and theories when we study these mar-
kets. 
As an example, consider the global character of financial 
markets. One can argue that the distinct historical devel-
opment of financial markets, their separation from pro-
ducer markets as well as their early deregulation has put 
these markets on a track towards globalization – some 
financial markets (e.g. currency markets) have in fact long 
been transnational. In other words, the financial system 
can arguably be considered a structure of the world rather 
than of national societies. Economies, on the other hand, 
have typically been localized; they are the economies of 
nation states. They depend on national regulatory frame-
works and institutions, tax and social security systems, 
national policies and interventions. They use national cur-
rencies and presuppose the existence of a national central 
bank. Their localized character is reflected in national eco-
nomic indicators and in the attention given to them. Finan-
cial markets, in contrast, appear delocalized and disem-
bedded (in Giddens’ sense). Social geographers have long 
noticed this transnational character – they were among the 
first to observe the concentration of financial markets in 
global centers that are interconnected across time zones 
and continents (Sassen 2001; Leyshon and Thrift 1997). 
Not all financial markets, one should add, are equally 
global. While currency markets are inherently transnational 
markets, bond and equity markets are not, though they 
have become increasingly global in the most recent global-
ization wave. As Sassen (2005) shows, the value of cross-
border transactions in bonds and equities as a percentage 
of GDP in the leading economies was 4% in 1975 in the 
U.S., 35% in 1985 when the financial era was in full 
swing, and rose to 230% in 1998. This share grew from 
5% to 334% in Germany, and from 5% to 415% in 
France. Similar arguments can be made for exchanges 
which used to be national institutions but are in the proc-
ess of forming global alliances. The global character of 
these markets poses the question whether there can be a 
level of integration of markets that are distributed in space, 
what mechanisms beyond economic transactions link to-
gether these markets, how we can understand the trans-
national systems of communication in terms of which par-
ticipants interact (as purely economic speech acts?), and so 
on. In fact, most questions related to the phenomenon of 
globalization and a world society can be posed in this con-
text. The study of global financial markets also offers an-
swers to more general globalization-related questions – as 
a specialized, bounded domain, it can be researched in 
depth in real time – we do not have to contend with the 
difficulties of multicultural aggregate statistics, question-
able categories, etc. that globalization research struggles 
with. In addition, the financial system is a sociologically 
and culturally innovative expert system that experiments 
with creating and managing global forms. Accordingly, the 
answers we get from this research can tell us something 
about the structural components of an emerging global 
society. 
Fourth difference: The financial system is a knowledge 
system, and the sociology of finance and financial markets 
must include questions of knowledge and technology in its 
research. There are many ways in which knowledge and 
information are an intrinsic part of financial systems. 
economic sociology_the european electronic newsletter   Volume 8, Number 3 (July 2007) Economic Sociology and the Sociology of Finance  8
Economists, one should note, long assumed such a link; it 
emerges from the economists’ view that knowledge is 
contained in and extractable from asset prices or that the 
latent function of capital markets is to provide information 
for decision making. It also emerges from the analysts’ 
usage, in studies of foreign exchange trading patterns, of 
the number of transactions as a proxy for the information 
arrival process (for detailed references to this literature see 
Knorr Cetina and Bruegger 2002). To conceptualize the 
importance of knowledge in this area we can build on 
these ideas. The information contained in prices, for exam-
ple, not only helps dealers make decisions, it stimulates 
deals. In other words, the information arriving with price 
changes continually excites the system into further trading. 
Thus the speculative “exuberance” (Shiller 2000: 3) and 
the volatility that is a characteristic feature of financial 
markets (as opposed to producer markets or consumption-
oriented trading) appear intrinsically connected to the fast 
flow of information. Second, content-wise, the vast major-
ity of market exchanges that are not pure dealing se-
quences involve knowledge and information. “What we 
are really dealing in,” traders say, “is knowledge and in-
formation.” Knowledge is also the means of relationship 
building in global fields. Participants exchange information 
to build and maintain business links. This “commerce of 
knowledge and information” is based upon principles of 
reciprocity and gift exchange (information offered as a gift 
establishes and manages relationships); and the circuits of 
information partly overlap with trading transactions. Last, 
the knowledge flows map the world in which traders 
move; these flows constitute the special lifeworld of a 
global social form that has disembedded, left behind its 
natural embeddedness in local and physical settings. I ar-
gue that market reality itself is knowledge-generated, 
having no existence outside the informational presentation 
of the market on the screen that is provided by news 
agencies, analysts, and traders themselves. The point is 
that the wider nexus of economic, social, and “lifeworld” 
functions of knowledge in this area must be included in 
investigations of finance. Questions of information are of 
course present also in the production economy, as Marx 
pointed out when he referred to the role of technology 
and machines as potentially alienating factors in industrial 
settings. But they are neither background variables (crystal-
lized in equipment) nor source of alienation in financial 
settings. Information is scarce, intensely communicated, 
and highly valued. Most importantly, it is present in every 
aspect of finance and in the core activities of financial 
transactions. 
Conclusion: It is tempting to argue that it is the intrinsic 
relevance of knowledge and information to financial activi-
ties that motivated scholars from science studies to take a 
special interest in finance. They surely brought with them 
an awareness of the potential characteristics and special 
questions posed by sophisticated technological and knowl-
edge structures of this field. Did the intrinsic challenges of 
the financial system stimulate an interest from areas that 
were not part of economic sociology (social geographers, 
science studies) but found the challenges familiar? The 
answer, I think, is not so clear. Finance and financial mar-
kets have been a discovery project for everyone that looks 
at these areas. Financial information is in many ways quite 
unlike natural scientific knowledge; financial technologies 
do not correspond to the inscription devices and appara-
tuses that technosciences use; global systems of transac-
tion are not the everyday fare of laboratory studies, and so 
on. I, for one, did not step on a trading floor in search of 
characteristics I had encountered elsewhere – I moved into 
this field believing that financial capitalism was the direc-
tion in which postindustrial societies were developing, and 
it interested me what that meant. It is rather, I suppose, 
the tendency to behave unsociologically – in the sense of 
including in one’s research the core of an “alien” practice 
– whether it is the epistemic core of science or the specula-
tive core of finance – that characterizes these recent ef-
forts. 
Where will it all end? My prediction, for now, is that we 
will see two specialized fields: one concerned with larger 
questions of the economy and society and precise concep-
tual tools to define and transcribe economic action as 
social action, and the other concerned with a multifaceted, 
impure and voracious domain that until now often defies 
dissection by precision tools – that of financial markets. 
Karin Knorr Cetina teaches at the University of Constance 
and the University of Chicago, and is a member of the 
Institute for World Society Studies, University of Bielefeld, 
Germany. She is a former president of the International 
Society for Social Studies of Science, a former member of 
the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, and a future 
member of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behav-
ioral Sciences in Palo Alto, CA. She has published many 
articles in international journals on knowledge, science and 
financial markets and is the author of several books, in-
cluding  Epistemic Cultures: How the Sciences Make 
Knowledge (Harvard University Press, 1999), which re-
ceived two prizes. She is currently working on a book on 
the Global Microstructures of Financial Markets. 
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Endnotes 
1 It is also sometimes called social studies of finance to empha-
size, as I see it, the analytical relevance of fields outside sociology 
to the topics studied. 
2 To be sure, ours is not the first period in history that shows a 
heightened curiosity in financial markets. For some of these his-
torical developments from a sociological perspective, see Preda 
(2001), Mirowski (2002), Staeheli (2007). 
3 One assumes that this orientation will continue, given the 
changes now confronting the continent and the political prob-
lems, social consequences and issues of mentality that they in-
voke.  
4 Which is not to say that no one in economic sociology ever 
addressed consumption issues. But those who do often have 
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The Role of Bi-Level Social Networks in Building 




Economic sociology boasts substantial literature docu-
menting the presence and importance of social ties in 
enabling and facilitating exchange in contemporary 
markets (e.g., Baker 1984; Granovetter 1985; Uzzi 1996; 
White 2002). But this literature is lacking in two impor-
tant respects: (1) only a few of these accounts address 
the ties connecting sellers and consumers (and those 
that do are usually limited to small business and venture 
capital banking, see, for instance Uzzi 1999 and Miz-
ruchi/Stearns 2001); and (2) to the best of my knowl-
edge, none of these sources claim that networks are 
essential in constituting mass markets. 
The first oversight reflects a more general trend in eco-
nomic sociology (at least its structural wing) of placing 
the center of its intellectual gravity in matters of produc-
tion rather than consumption. The second is at least in 
part indicative of the usual way in which networks are 
theorized – as a set of ties connecting nodes of the same 
level (either individual actors or organizations). I am 
going to demonstrate that when conceived of as ties 
that link both firms and actors, networks have been 
playing a key role in bringing about the mass consumer 
finance market in Russia. 
The material for this article is part of the author’s forth-
coming book on the emergence of the Russian credit 
card market. Empirical data comes from fieldwork in 
Moscow, Russia in 1998-1999 and 2003-2005, which 
included interviews with representatives of banks, bank 
associations, companies that process card transactions 
and credit card networks, participation in card-related 
conferences and workshops, analyses of bank materials, 
industry publications and current periodicals. 
The Twin Problems of Uncertainty and 
Complementarity 
What do credit card markets teach us about consump-
tion and the role of networks in constituting mass mar-
kets? 
Emerging credit card markets are faced with two prob-
lems, uncertainty and complementarity (Guseva 2005). 
Uncertainly is the problem that exists in many markets 
and may even be ubiquitous in all markets (Beckert 
1996), so I won’t elaborate on it beyond what is obvi-
ous: that issuing a credit card (or extending a loan, more 
generally) is a beginning of a long-term relationship 
between the bank and the client, and lenders are uncer-
tain about the repayment of borrowed amounts. 
The problem of complementarity warrants a closer look. 
Economists and management scholars postulated the 
existence of demand-side increasing returns (DSIR) mar-
kets, where the value of each additional product to con-
sumer increases with the number of items already in use 
by others (Katz/ Shapiro 1985; Saloner et al. 2001). Ex-
amples of such markets include markets for telephones, 
faxes and other means of communication that presup-
pose connectedness and compatibility. For example, 
owning a telephone if none of your friends or acquaint-
ances owns one is useless, but getting one when there 
are others you can call is beneficial since you are joining 
an already existing group of users. In addition, each 
additionally produced (and purchased) device increases 
the value of owning the already existing ones. In other 
words, phone owners continue reaping benefits from 
owning their devices with each additional phone user 
added to the group. Once the number of users reaches a 
critical mass stage (Granovetter 1978), new members 
start joining in a snowballing fashion. The network starts 
growing on its own, attracting new members by virtue 
of its sheer size. 
This logic is applicable to emerging credit card markets 
as well, except that there the value of owning a card 
does not increase directly with the number of those who 
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already have cards, but indirectly: more cardholders 
means that more merchants would be willing to accept 
cards, and this, in turn, will attract more individuals to 
sign up to become cardholders. Credit card markets are 
therefore two-sided markets (Rochet/ Tirole 2004; Rys-
man 2006; Armstrong 2006): markets that through an 
intermediary (in this case, a bank that issues cards) con-
nect two groups, merchants and consumers; each of the 
groups is sensitive to how well the intermediary per-
forms in the other one. 
Cardholders and merchants are said to be mutually 
complementary, as one group cannot function without 
the other, and the growth in each group makes joining 
the other one more attractive (Milgrom et al. 1991). The 
two groups have to be recruited simultaneously; reach-
ing a critical mass stage by one group sends a positive 
feedback to the other group and encourages more of 
them to join. Therefore, no cardholders – no merchants, 
and vice versa. Unless the vicious circle is broken, the 
market simply would not take off. Once a positive feed-
back is received, numbers of cardholders and merchants 
start growing in a complementary fashion: “As more 
consumers have a particular card brand and more mer-
chants take that card brand, it becomes harder and 
harder for other merchants not to take that card brand” 
(Evans/Schmalensee 1999:151, emphasis is mine). 
Quite paradoxically, the two problems, complementarity 
and uncertainty, seem to require contradictory solutions 
(Table 1). The problem of uncertainty requires careful 
pre-screening, and it can be time-consuming (if pre-
screening uses experts to conduct in-depth analyses of 
prospective borrowers’ cases); thus, it only allows for a 
slower market expansion. In addition, pre-screening 
narrows down the pool of potential applicants by weed-
ing out “poor risks,” and yeilding a smaller number of 
“suitable” cardholders. Slower market expansion and 
smaller pool aggravate the problem of complementarity. 
In other words, careful screening prevents card issuers 
from quickly reaching critical mass of cardholders neces-
sary for getting merchants’ interested, and therefore, 
from achieving positive feedback and ultimate market 
success. Moreover, in emerging markets, which usually 
lack necessary formal institutions such as credit bureaus, 
lenders have to resort to social networks to pre-screen 
and monitor prospective borrowers. This sets natural 
limitations on the size of the issuers’ clientele and further 
prevents lenders from solving the problem of comple-
mentarity. If one is too careful in screening, the market 
might never develop. On the other hand, if one is not 
too careful and issues cards quickly but indiscriminately 
in an attempt to solve complementarity, market expan-
sion can bring ruin: card issuers might be faced with 
mounting defaults and fraud. 
  Uncertainty Complementarity
Solutions  Careful pre-
screening 
Quickly issuing 
cards en masse 
in order to 
attract merchants 
Consequences Smaller pool of 
potential custom-
ers, slower market 
expansion 
Card issuing in the 
absence of pre-
screening aggra-
vates the problem 
of adverse selec-
tion, and can 
jeopardize future 
economic sound-
ness of the market 
Table 1. Contradictory solutions to uncertainty and 
complementarity problems in an emergent credit 
card market 
Card issuers in emerging markets have to carefully bal-
ance between these two competing pressures – to jump-
start the market and to control uncertainty. Of the two 
problems, complementarity is temporary. It is only im-
portant initially and becomes irrelevant once the card 
acceptance network is established and the demand for 
cards becomes self-generated. Card issuers always strive 
to issue more cards, but in established markets this be-
comes part of the usual market competition. Unlike the 
complementarity, the challenge of uncertainty is perma-
nent. As much as it has to be solved by each new debu-
tante on the card issuing scene, existing card issuers are 
also regularly revising their screening and monitoring 
approaches to react to market changes, to accommo-
date their new products or to appeal to new consumer 
groups. 
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Why Has Consumption been 
Downplayed in Economic Sociology 
Literature? 
Recent surge of interest in the study of concrete markets 
among economic sociologists ranges from industrial 
production markets (White 1981; Burt 1992; Fligstein 
2001; Podolny 2005), to biotechnology (Powell et al. 
1996; Podolny 2005) to labor markets (Granovetter 
1995[1974]; Fernandez et al. 2000; Yakubovich 2005), 
to financial exchange markets, such as securities and 
stock and bond markets (Baker 1981; Abolafia 1996; 
Zuckerman 1999; Knorr-Cetina/ Brugger 2002; 
Mackenzie/ Millo 2003; Podolny 2005), and even markets 
for art, photography, wine and book publishing (Powell 
1985; Aspers 2001; Podolny 2005; Velthuis 2005).1 But 
hardly any attention has been paid to the problem of 
constructing consumer demand. In this sense, most 
economic sociologists are not much different from neo-
classical economists who assume that firms and markets 
emerge in response to existing niches. For example, 
Swedberg (2005) in the recent edition of The Handbook 
of Economic Sociology discusses Harrison White’s posi-
tion on the social construction of markets: “If business-
men are correct in their calculations, they will be able to 
locate a niche in the market for their products, which 
their customers acknowledge by buying a certain volume 
at a certain price” (Swedberg 2005: 245; see also Zuck-
erman 1999 for a critique of a position that ignores 
consumer side). The irony of such a position is that the 
argument about social constitution of markets is made 
with an assumption of consumer demand existing objec-
tively and independently, waiting to be tapped by an 
entrepreneur with a vision. White’s own words establish 
the focus of his work even more squarely away from 
demand and consumption: “Markets are tangible cliques 
of producers watching each other. Pressure from the 
buyer side creates a mirror in which producers see them-
selves, not consumers” (1981: 543). 
Competition is undoubtedly the essence of the market 
that distinguishes it from other ways of organizing eco-
nomic activity. Nevertheless it is a mistake to think of 
markets exclusively through the prism of producers 
struggling for a bigger market share. While this project 
focuses mainly on the banks’ vision of the market, its 
problems and ways to solve them, what I hope to dem-
onstrate is that consumers’ collective behavior decides 
the shape and the ultimate fate of the market, and that 
they should not be downplayed as mere objects of 
banks’ competition. 
Traditional emphasis on production “with no more than 
occasional gestures towards consumption” (Zelizer 
2005: 332) reflects a deep-seated problem in contempo-
rary sociology. Frenzen, Hirsch and Zerillo attribute it to 
the historic context in which both economics and sociol-
ogy developed – a period “when the industrial produc-
tion was still young and manufactured goods were still 
commodities for which consumer demand greatly ex-
ceeded the available supply,” resulting in scarcity and 
allowing to take high consumer demand for granted 
(Frenzen et al. 1994: 403). But modern production ca-
pacities outstrip consumers’ ability to consume, isolating 
the problem of demand and bringing it to the forefront. 
Ezra Zuckerman (1999) raises the issue of consumer 
demand in his work on securities markets – mediated 
markets, where demand depends on financial analysts’ 
perceptions of different products. They are the main 
shapers of demand even though it is mass consumers 
that eventually buy securities, and it is to these market 
critics that producers pay the most attention. Zucker-
man’s main question is how consumers evaluate alterna-
tive products on the market, and his answer is that they 
rely on critics, who legitimize them and put them in 
appropriate categories of already existing products. 
While Zuckerman engages with a problem rarely ad-
dressed by economic sociologists, his work reflects an-
other prevalent trend in the literature, namely the focus 
on the functioning of already existing markets, rather 
than on the process of emergence of entirely new mar-
kets. Even a couple of sociological studies with promis-
ing titles, like Harrison White’s Where Do Markets Come 
from? (1981) or Mitchell Abolafia’s Making Markets 
(2001) concentrate exclusively on what existing markets 
are rather than on how new markets are built. As a 
result, there is little opportunity to ask a question of how 
producers generate demand for entirely new products – 
those that cannot be easily fit into an existing category. 
In established markets, the problem of consumer de-
mand shifts to product differentiation. For instance, it is 
no longer necessary to build consumer demand for 
credit cards in the United States market. Strong con-
sumer demand exists for this category of products. They 
have been long established as the instrument of every-
day use, enabling such long-distance transactions as car 
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rentals, hotel bookings and Internet purchases. Yet, 
different card issuers (banks or multinationals) are com-
peting within the accepted category of cards, offering 
various perks in order to entice consumers to switch to 
their particular card brand or a specific card product. 
It is in new emerging markets that the problem of build-
ing consumer demand can be particularly acute. Viviana 
Zelizer’s work (1978) on the rise of life insurance in the 
19th century America explicitly addresses the problem of 
initial consumer resistance to an emergent market. Po-
tential consumers of life insurance considered it cultur-
ally unacceptable to put a price tag on human life. Life 
insurance policies challenged the prevailing distinction 
between sacred (life) and profane (monetary value), and 
exemplified the difficulty of building demand for a new 
product. What eventually made life insurance sell was 
the process of “sacralization” – “the transformation of 
the monetary evaluation of death into a [secular] ritual” 
(1978: 605). The notion of “good death” started to 
involve financial arrangements for family members left 
behind. Life insurance money was portrayed as a source 
of remembrance and a way to achieve immortality in the 
eyes of living relatives. This was a cultural solution to the 
problem of constituting demand. New cultural frames 
helped change initial negative perceptions of life insur-
ance (see also Chan 2006 on the rise of life insurance in 
China). 
In the case of the Russian credit card market, one sees 
similar obstacles and more. In addition to cultural resis-
tance, such as distrust of banks, traditional reliance on 
savings and cash to pay for purchases, and informal no-
interest borrowing from friends and family, there was 
also strategic resistance, namely the barrier of comple-
mentarity. Not only were prospective Russian consumers 
wary of or uncomfortable with non-cash payments or 
bank-procured credit, but they were also resistant be-
cause there were still too few merchants (or merchants 
of a wrong kind – large hotels and high-end boutiques) 
accepting cards. Merchants, in turn, were reluctant to 
sign up, waiting for consumers to obtain cards first. 
How Networks Help Build Mass 
Markets 
Historically, while social networks were the skeleton of 
local exchange, as mass national markets emerged, net-
works started to break down under the pressure of 
greater geographic, social and cultural distances be-
tween transaction parties. They were replaced by other 
forms of governance, such as formal institutions and 
professions that enabled transactions between strangers 
sharing little or nothing in terms of social circles or cul-
ture (Zucker 1986). 
My argument is that in Russia networks help construct 
mass markets thanks to their unique ability to help sell-
ers both access and assess their prospective consumers. 
The reason that traditional approaches to networks are 
unable to account for the presence of networks in mass 
markets is that the analysis is always restricted to rela-
tions between nodes of the same level – individuals or 
organizations (either informal interpersonal relations 
between producers/ entrepreneurs or power/ property 
relations between firms, on the latter point see Stark 
1996), never combining the two. Moreover, interorgani-
zational ties are often reduced to interpersonal ones 
(through interlocking directorates, for instance). When 
some scholars allow for the variability in the type of the 
tie (Granovetter 1985; Powel et al. 1996; Uzzi 1996), 
relations are still between nodes of the same level. Yet, 
such uni-level networks can only capture a partial snap-
shot of a mass market, which is by definition a market 
where large firms (organizations) produce goods or ser-
vices for mass consumption (therefore, for consumption 
by a large number of individual actors). For instance, an 
analysis of interorganizational ties between banks and 
employing organizations does not capture the role that 
ties between organizations and their employees could 
play in facilitating card dissemination. 
It is precisely when we conceive of networks as combin-
ing nodes of two different levels – both organizations 
and persons, that they can be viewed as contributing to 
the creation of a mass consumer market. Organizations 
usually have relationships with large groups of individu-
als, whether their employees ones or customers ones. If 
producers can persuade organizations to provide them 
with access to these individuals, they would instantly 
reach scores of potential buyers. 
Two particular strategies exemplify Russian banks’ use of 
networks in building mass consumer finance markets: 
salary projects and consumer lending in retail locations. 
Salary projects are agreements between banks and large 
or medium-size enterprises to have all their employees’ 
salaries directly deposited to banks, while employees are 
issued bank debit cards (usually with an overdraft fea-
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ture). Salary projects are usually administered to the 
bank’s current corporate customers, but can also be 
used as a bait to attract new corporate customers. Such 
salary direct deposit agreements were the principal way 
of card dissemination in Russia in the 1990s, allowing 
banks to quickly increase the number of cardholders 
(Guseva 2005).2 However, despite the impressive rate of 
growth in the number of cards, few cardholders used 
them for non-cash transactions. The majority made a 
stop at the ATM first and then headed to stores armed 
with cash. This deprived banks of merchant discount3 
and sabotaged their attempts to solve the complemen-
tarity problem (since merchants were not part of the 
picture). 
Thus, even if successful in disseminating cards to thou-
sands of individuals banks could still fail in solving the 
complementarity problem. Even with cards in their wal-
lets consumers still preferred cash over plastic, and sav-
ing over borrowing. Consumer culture indispensable for 
the success of credit card markets includes willingness to 
go into debt, willingness to borrow from banks, and 
readiness to pay interest. If by the time that credit cards 
appeared on the American stage (in the late 1950s, 
[Nocera 1994]), American consumers had already devel-
oped these dispositions (Nugent 1939; Mandel 1990; 
Calder 1999), among the Russians, traditional preference 
for cash and resistance to borrowing at an interest pre-
vailed. Mass distribution of cards in the 1990s, even if 
looking impressive in VISA reports, was nevertheless 
failing to prompt a revolution in buying. Arming indi-
viduals with cards was not enough to make them spend. 
Starting in 2001-2003, Russian banks developed an 
alternative strategy of mass card distribution – that is of 
offering credit cards to short-on-cash consumers in large 
consumer electronics or furniture chain stores or shop-
ping malls. The credit card market benefited from the 
recent spectacular growth in household lending in Rus-
sia, which was a result of the overall economic growth, 
rising living standards, increasing disposable income, and 
the expansion of the retail industry. 
Unlike salary projects, lending in retail locations brought 
three parties essential to a credit card market – banks, 
cardholders and merchants, together in the same place, 
making individuals interested in cards and available for 
banks, and making merchants central to consumers’ 
decisions to obtain cards and to use them to shop. 
Capitalizing on retailers’ ability to attract customers in 
their shops and in malls utilizes what I call a locational 
benefit of bi-level networks: in order to reach mass cus-
tomers a company needs to identify a way that they can 
be targeted as a group. While retailers only assist banks 
in providing access to prospective cardholders without 
helping to pre-screen them, in the case of card-issuing 
through employing organizations (salary projects), em-
ployers do not only provide access to prospective cus-
tomers, but also help banks in managing the problem of 
uncertainty. In this arrangement, employing organizations 
amplify the usual ability of social networks to reduce un-
certainty by channeling information, and producing 
greater transparency and trust. Organizational structure 
anchors individuals firmly in intra-organizational rela-
tions, both vertical and horizontal, making it easier to 
monitor them. I call this a relational benefit of bi-level 
networks. 
Only when networks are viewed as tying together both 
organizations and persons, can we start appreciating 
how existing roles and relations are recalibrated to assist 
current needs. For example, an existing relationship 
between “a corporate bank” and “a firm, which is this 
bank’s corporate client” can be transformed into a rela-
tionship between “a retail bank” and “an employing 
organization that makes its employees available to the 
bank as potential customers.” Likewise, in situations 
when holders of salary cards could use them in factory-
owned stores and eateries, an employer-employee tie is 
reformulated as tie between a retailer and consumers.4
An important question to address is how banks manage 
to make organizations interested in providing them with 
access to individuals. Arrangements with retailers can 
range from zero (banks open their booths in large malls 
without a specific agreement with any of the stores) to 
bilateral agreements to issue co-branded cards (usually 
with large stores, such as IKEA), which also offer various 
loyalty perks (discounts, promotions, etc.). Salary projects 
presuppose well-specified agreements signed by both 
the bank and the employing organization. While in both 
cases banks start with using organizations as a middle-
man that provides access or “introduces” them to their 
potential cardholders, banks end up successfully refor-
mulating their own role as middlemen between compa-
nies and individuals (Figures 1 and 2). 
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Figure 1. Bank Approaches an Organization (Phase 1). 




In the case of salary projects, banks offer their services as 
cashiers regulating wage payments between companies 
and their workers, and freeing employers from trans-
porting, securing and dispensing cash. In the case of 
consumer credit projects, banks enable purchases that 
otherwise would not happen since consumers lack cash, 
freeing merchants from the need to finance purchases 
themselves. In contrast to churches or professional socie-
ties that also have access to large groups of individuals 
and could put banks in contact with their members, 
retailers need banks as much as banks need retailers. 
Thus, in both cases of consumer credit and salary pro-
jects, the arrangements between banks and organiza-
tions are framed as mutually beneficial: banks get access 
to prospective customers, and companies are rid from 
providing services for which they are not suited profes-
sionally. 
Figure 2: Bank Positions itself as a Middleman 
(Phase 2). 
These strategies are not limited to emerging markets in 
transitional contexts. There are plenty of examples of 
sellers turning to organizations to both reduce uncer-
tainty and facilitate access to mass consumers in modern 
capitalist societies such as the US. This includes market-
ing cards on university campuses or next to airline termi-
nals (especially those with mileage programs), relying on 
lists provided by credit bureaus to send out pre-approved 
applications,5 and selling group insurance policies through 
employing organizations. In the latter example, employers 
do not only help insurance companies to access prospec-
tive consumers, but also reduce the problem of adverse 
selection and help them turn uncertainty into quantifi-
able risk. This suggests that new markets can emerge by 
capitalizing on already existing markets. Specifically, 
Russian credit card market has been relying on labor and 
retail markets. 
The idea of analytically tying both organizations and 
individuals in the same network is borrowed from organ-
izational literature, which treats both of them as actors 
(Scott et al. 2001), however, downplaying relationships 
between them. I focus on ties between them because 
they are sought after by banks and other companies 
struggling to create new markets. These ties are not 
necessarily meaningful social relationships like the ones 
linking friends or colleagues. Organizations, even if they 
are our employers, usually do not know us intimately, 
but they possess some information about us, and have a 
certain degree of control over us. At the very least, we 
need them to provide services or goods. We come to 
organizations to fulfill these needs, and this is why our 
ties to organizations become such valuable assets for 
market makers that strive to reach their prospective 
customers. Access that organizations provide can involve 
different degrees of coercion. For example, applying for 
a credit card in a store where one just saw an item that 
is too expensive to be paid for in cash, is entirely volun-
tary. Employees, on the other hand, have no choice if 
their administration has signed an agreement with the 




The task of explaining how the Russian credit card mar-
ket is being constructed would not be adequately done 
without a reference to bi-level networks that combine 
both individuals and organizations. Such networks play a 
key role in helping build mass consumer markets be-
Individuals/potential 
cardholders  
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cause they help banks access and sometimes even assess 
their potential customers. 
In the context of post-communist transition, bi-level 
networks offer an alternative mechanism of market-
building, especially when “right” institutions that sup-
port mature markets in the West are not yet available. 
Rather than conjuring markets out of thin air in an or-
derly response to perceived opportunities as the neolib-
eral logic seems to be suggesting, Russian market mak-
ers create markets out of the existing fragments of social 
structure – networks and organizations which are recali-
brated and fitted to new uses (Stark 1996; Sedaitis 
1998; McDermott 2002). 
Bi-level networks expand our understanding of the role 
of networks in markets, and highlight the need for eco-
nomic sociology to pay greater attention to the matters 
of consumption. 
Alya Guseva is Assistant Professor of Sociology at Bos-
ton University. Her work explores the role of networks, 
institutions and culture in the development of mass 
financial markets in the post-communist world. She has 
published in American Sociological Review, Socio-Economic 
Review, American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 
Social Science Research and Theory and Society. She is 
completing work on a large collaborative project compar-
ing emerging credit card markets in several countries of 
East-Central Europe and Asia. Her book Into the Red: 
The Birth of the Credit Card Market in Post-communist 
Russia is forthcoming with Stanford University Press. 
Endnotes 
1  For an overview of approaches to markets in neighboring 
disciplines and current research on markets in economic sociol-
ogy see Lie (1997), Swedberg (1994) and Swedberg (2005). 
2 Prior to the rise of salary projects, salaries were paid in cash 
and few banks had large household customer base. 
3 A percentage of sales merchants pay to banks for the privi-
lege of accepting cards in their locations. 
4 Incidentally, this fluidity of roles is one of the socialist legacies 
when employing organizations did not only provide workers 
with jobs, but also with recreation, deficit goods, healthcare 
and daycare, exemplified in particularly in the Chinese “iron 
rice bowl.”  
5 This suggests that besides their traditional function of reduc-
ing uncertainty (by assisting in screening, monitoring and sanc-
tioning of borrowers), credit bureaus also help banks gain 
access to groups of borrowers. 
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Ten Years That Shook the Market 
Much that can be said about the economic Zeitgeist of 
1990s America can be encapsulated in the publication of 
three books in rapid succession between May and Septem-
ber 1999: Dow 36,000; Dow 40,000; and Dow 100,000. 
Issued by three different publishers, and written by three 
different sets of authors, each book vied to be the most 
optimistic about the upward trajectory of U.S. stocks. Though 
we might now wish to shelve these books in the science 
fiction section of the library, at the time their ideas were 
treated quite seriously and discussed earnestly in public 
news forums. However implausible it might seem in the 
morning-after light of the early 21st century, these books 
simply reflected the remarkable events occurring immedi-
ately before and after their publication. 
Among the most notable legacies of this extraordinary pe-
riod was the transformation of the majority of adults in the 
U.S. into investors. Investing was once the exclusive province 
of a tiny elite: in 1900, only one percent of Americans 
owned stocks, and that number barely changed for genera-
tions, reaching only four percent by 1952. But investing 
became a mass activity during the 1990s, so that by the 
end of the 20
th century, an unprecedented 53 percent of 
Americans held investments in the stock market. More-
over, half of these new investors were women, and many 
others were people of color – two groups that were scarcely 
to be found anywhere near Wall Street until the past dec-
ade. A report by the United States Congress called it “an 
explosion in stock ownership.”1 The New York Times pro-
claimed a new era of “shareholder democracy”2 and News-
week  called it “one of the great social movements of the 
1990s.”3 
Who were these new investors, and what was the socio-
economic impact of their mass entry into the stock mar-
ket? Though they were the object of much speculation and 
hyperbole, the rise of these “retail” investors, as they are 
known to finance professionals, was so swift that no one 
really knew. So I conducted a study to find out. My book, 
Pop Finance: Investment Clubs and Stock Market Populism 
(forthcoming from Princeton University Press), is the first – 
and, as far as I know, still the only – study to examine this 
“new investor class.” The book is based on two years of 
multi-method research I conducted, starting with a year of 
participant observation and followed by a national survey. 
The initial research was conducted in 1998, near the 
height of the bull market; following the market’s swift 
decline in a few years later, I returned to the investors I had 
worked with in my original participant observation study, 
and interviewed them about how their financial behavior 
and outlook had changed. 
Despite the dramatic changes in the market since 1998, 
retail investors are still very much an important force in the 
U.S. stock market, and I believe they will continue to wield 
significant influence. That is because they are not in the 
market just to make a quick buck – although that is always 
a factor – but as a result of institutional imperatives that 
have transformed the provision of old age insurance from 
a collective responsibility into a problem that individuals 
must solve for themselves. As European readers may know, 
the U.S. government offers very little in the way of a social 
safety net for citizens, and what little we have is shrinking. 
This has created a colossal public policy problem: the pub-
lic sector is withdrawing from what few pension obliga-
tions it once had at the very time that a large segment of 
the population is approaching retirement age. 
This collision of demographic and institutional change has 
catalyzed an urgent need to generate retirement savings: 
for many people, the stock market seemed the only way to 
make enough money quickly to avoid the spectre of an 
impoverished old age. The view that mass investment in 
the stock market would solve the looming retirement crisis 
was popularized in the press and by the government itself, 
which underscored the point in 1997 with a massive cut in 
the capital gains tax: essentially privileging investment 
income over earned income from work. As more Ameri-
cans were swayed by these incentives, more started invest-
ing, driving stock prices up, and making the profit oppor-
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tunities even more attractive to other investors – creating, 
in essence, the kind of recursive, self-referential system 
typical of speculative manias.4 
Investment Clubs and the New Investor 
Class 
How did this new majority of retail investors gain entrée 
into the stock market in the first place? It is a non-trivial 
question, since until the 1990s, there was virtually no way 
to invest without the mediation of a stock broker: profes-
sionals who charged hefty commissions on each trade, and 
who would often simply refuse to provide services to any-
one except the wealthy; most brokers regarded small in-
vestors (including women) as simply not worth their time. 
But even with the advent of discount brokerage, including 
online services like eTrade, there still remained formidable 
barriers to would-be retail investors: namely, the expense 
of the stocks themselves, and the complex, arcane lan-
guage that had to be learned in order to begin investing. 
This is how investment clubs – voluntary associations of 10 
to 15 people who pool their money to invest in the stock 
market – came to serve as the main point of entry into the 
stock market for millions of Americans. The clubs allowed 
individuals to benefit from economies of scale in both 
financial and temporal terms: by contributing just $15 to 
$20 at each monthly meeting, each member could buy 
stocks with the other club members, something they could 
never afford as individuals; and during the two-hour meet-
ings, during which members would present stock purchase 
or sale ideas to the club, everyone got some of the invest-
ment education they needed. Thus, by the late 1990s, in-
vestment clubs went from being an obscure hobbyist move-
ment imported from Europe a century before into a mass 
socio-economic phenomenon that involved some 11 percent 
of U.S. investors – about 20 million people. 5 
Despite the market downturn since the dot.com bubble 
burst in early 2000, these investment clubs and their mem-
bers still wield significant economic power. The figures for 
one national investment club association tell the story: their 
thousands of member clubs (composed of half a million 
individual members) collectively own $125 billion worth of 
the U.S. stock market and invest an additional $190 million 
each month.6 Those figures are comparable in magnitude 
to the investments of CalPERS – the California Public Em-
ployees’ Retirement System – which has $143 billion in 
assets under management and is the world’s largest pen-
sion fund.7 Moreover, retail investors exert a large influ-
ence on the market relative to their numbers: while 
CalPERS represents over 1.2 million California public em-
ployees, there are just a few hundred thousand investment 
club members in the U.S. Though investment clubs do not 
act as a single unit, as CalPERS and other pension funds 
do, there is still a consistent pattern of stock ownership 
among the clubs. For example, the clubs belonging to one 
national association alone own $562 million worth of 
General Electric, $423 million worth of Intel, and $1.3 
billion worth of the insurance company AFLAC – about 7 
percent of shares outstanding. 
Given the historical significance of investment clubs in facili-
tating the retail investor boom, as well as the economic 
influence these investors continue to wield through invest-
ment clubs, it becomes important for scholars to under-
stand how these economic actors think about the market 
and how they choose to allocate their money. A major 
objective of my study was to document the real-world 
behavior of American investors and to offer an alternative 
to what might be called the “official” version of stock 
market dynamics presented by economics and finance, 
which marginalizes social influences on investor behavior 
under the rubric of “noise trading.”8 Ethnographic re-
search on the practices of investment professionals shows 
that social influences on investing are not limited to ama-
teurs, but rather pervade the stock market: as one promi-
nent economist put it, “apart from a few lonely Warren 
Buffetts, institutional investors exist in a community that is 
exceptionally closely knit by constant communication and 
mutual exposure.”9  
Of all the ways to approach this phenomenon, investment 
clubs provide a particularly appealing starting point, not 
only because of their economic significance but because 
they offer the opportunity for detailed observation of the 
social processes involved in investing. They allow the com-
plex set of practices that is the stock market to be studied 
on a manageable scale.10 Second, investment club meet-
ings make the decision processes of investors available for 
analysis. Among individual investors, decision-making can 
be very difficult to study because so much of the process is 
internal; little is accessible directly to researchers. In other 
words, while it is not difficult to find out what investors 
do, it can be difficult to discover why. 
In contrast, investment clubs make these processes explicit 
and available for the researcher. That is because the group 
process requires members to debate their decisions and 
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take a vote before acting; during the clubs’ monthly meet-
ings, members must articulate their reasons for wanting to 
buy or sell stocks. They have to debate the pros and cons 
explicitly. Thus, their decisions can be observed unfolding 
in “real time,” rather than being reconstructed retrospec-
tively, with all the potential biases that implies. Observation 
provides more accurate data through direct access to the 
process of investment decision-making in groups: a wide-
spread, but under-researched phenomenon about which 
we need to learn much more. 
Methodology 
Since there was no prior research on investment clubs, I 
was unable to embark directly on a large-scale survey pro-
ject. Instead, I began building knowledge of the groups 
through observation and interviews. The qualitative phase 
of the study involved participant observation of seven in-
vestment clubs in the San Francisco Bay Area over the 
course of a year. This portion of the project was guided by 
two goals: to develop theory and to generate questions for 
a survey to be mailed to investment clubs nationally. The 
survey, which gathered both club-level and individual-level 
information, was intended to create a broader picture of 
investment club performance, composition and practices, 
and to serve as a context and benchmark for the qualita-
tive findings. 
The sample I selected for participant observation was de-
signed to provide insight into as broad a spectrum of inves-
tors as possible while remaining a manageable size for 
steady, long-term observation. Thus, the sample included 
clubs of varying gender composition: two all-female, two 
mixed and three all-male – a category I oversampled be-
cause of the small proportion they represent among in-
vestment clubs nationally. The sample also varied by age of 
club:  one group was brand new, having formed just a 
month before I began observations, while another had 
been in business for more than 40 years. The members 
themselves were diverse in terms of race/ ethnicity, occupa-
tions and age: participants ranged from mid-20s to mid-
80s. Finally, I sought variation in performance, including 
clubs that earned substantial profits on their investments 
and those that merely limped along, even during a rising 
market. The average investment club in the U.S. earns a 
rate of return of approximately 12.6 percent on their port-
folios since inception; while this was somewhat above the 
historical average returns of the U.S. stock market over the 
past century, it was low for the late 1990s, when rates of 
return on the market overall often exceeded 30 percent. 
Based on what I learned from attending the monthly meet-
ings of these seven groups, I developed a mail survey that 
went out to 3,000 randomly-selected investment clubs 
across the U.S. Each club received a packet containing two 
anonymous survey instruments: one designed to glean group-
level information, along with 15 copies of a survey designed 
to gather data from individual club members. The club presi-
dents filled out a four-page survey consisting of 30 ques-
tions about club performance and structure. Individual sur-
vey participants also received a four-page survey, which 
included 31 multiple-choice and Likert-style questions about 
their demographic background and investing behavior, both 
within and outside of the club. Usable responses were re-
turned by a total of 1279 clubs, a response rate of 43 per-
cent. The survey also yielded individual level data from over 
11,000 members within those clubs; the average rate of 
individual participation in the study was 70 percent 
(s.d.=.18). 
The survey data painted a portrait of investment club 
members that closely resembled the averages for the U.S. 
population as a whole. The average individual survey re-
spondent was between 45 and 50 years old, college edu-
cated, earned $52,000 per year (s.d.=$13,000), had 11 
years of investing experience (s.d.=6.6), and had belonged 
to his or her club since its inception. At the group level of 
analysis, the average club responding to my survey had 
been in operation for 4.3 years (s.d.=6.4 years), owned a 
portfolio worth $43,000 (s.d.=$73,000) and had 15 mem-
bers (s.d.=5). While it was not possible to compare the 
sample frame for this study with the entire population of 
investment clubs, analysis of archival data from the non-
responding clubs indicated no significant difference in 
terms of composition, size, age or portfolio value between 
clubs that did or did not respond to the survey. 
Major Findings 
Using the theoretical framework I developed in the partici-
pant observation part of my study, I developed ideas to 
test and generalize with the survey data, which I analyzed 
using standard OLS regression techniques. Below, I have 
summarized some key findings based on both types of 
data. Since I can’t be as complete as I’d like in this format, I 
hope that interested readers will contact me with their 
questions. 
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Investing as Shopping: the Consumer Orientation to 
the Stock Market 
As part of the social studies of finance literature, my study 
takes the view that the proper study of markets is how 
actors assign value to things. Thus, one of the main topics 
of interest in my research was how investors decide what 
stocks are worth buying, and at what price. Though the 
questions are rational, the process of answering them is 
not, in that numerous social forces come into play – par-
ticularly social psychological factors like identity and im-
pression management. 
The evidence I gathered suggests that people buy stocks in 
much the same way they buy consumer products like jeans 
and cars: with an eye not only to the utilitarian properties 
of the purchase (e.g., something to wear, to drive, or to 
make money with), but also with consideration for how 
those purchases speak for them: what they say to the 
world about the kind of person the purchaser is. While it 
might seem as though a stock is far less observable and 
available for interpretation by one’s peers than an item of 
clothing or a car, it turns out that investors discuss their 
portfolios frequently (not to say incessantly) within the 
social setting of their investment clubs as well as within 
their neighborhoods, families and workgroups. As a result, 
one social psychological study found, there is an extremely 
high correlation in investment choices within neighbor-
hoods: individuals buy virtually the same stocks that their 
neighbors and coworkers, because they hear about those 
stocks at barbeques, PTA meetings and around the water 
cooler.11  
In both the qualitative and quantitative portions of my 
study, I found that American investors seem to have taken 
to heart the advice of one of the best-known and best-
selling investment books in the U.S., which advised would-
be investors to “buy what you know.”12 It turns out that 
what people believe they know best is themselves, and 
they buy stocks that are congruent with their identities (or 
aspirations) as men, women and moral people. The impor-
tance of congruence with notions of self is woven through-
out my data on the processes investors use to make deci-
sions among the thousands of stocks available to them. 
In fact, I documented repeated instances in which investors 
rejected stocks because they, as one participant in an all-
women’s investment club put it, “couldn’t identify with” 
or didn’t wish to be associated with some firms. This dis-
identification was sometimes based on corporate reputa-
tion, as in the case of the club that declined to invest in the 
building-supply firm Home Depot because of its reputation 
for discriminating against women employees. But more 
often, it was a matter of taste, or what Bourdieu would call 
“distinction,” as in the case of the group that refused to buy 
stock in La-Z-Boy – a manufacturer of reclining chairs and 
sofas associated with middle-brow American décor – be-
cause, despite the firm’s excellent economic prospects, it 
came with class-linked connotations that the investors 
thought would reflect poorly on them. 
The process of impression management was also evident in 
the tension retail investors experienced around maintaining 
their social identities as “good people.” For instance, a 
surprisingly large number of clubs chose names like “Inves-
tors for Christ,” “L’Chaim Investors” or “Episcobucks,” 
suggesting that the age-old conflict between ethics and 
virtue on the one hand, and money and profit on the 
other, is still highly salient to contemporary investors. I also 
saw investors repeatedly reject investments they agreed 
were likely to be very profitable because they considered 
the product itself (as opposed to the firm) dangerous and 
antisocial; for example, one very successful all-women’s 
investment club, after a lengthy and positive financial 
analysis of Harley-Davidson, decided not to buy the stock 
because they came to the reluctant conclusion that, at 
heart, they believed motorcycles were dangerous and anti-
social! 
The identity issue, and the consumer approach to invest-
ing, went far beyond investment club members’ attempts to 
make what they perceived as socially-responsible choices. I 
found that investors also thought about stocks in a gen-
dered way, even going so far as to create a mental model 
of the stock market that parsed investments into “girl 
stocks” and “boy stocks” – much the way small children 
learning their gender roles sort occupations into jobs for 
girls (e.g., nurse) and jobs for boys (e.g., doctor). 
The gender division of the stock market seemed to occur 
along lines that were first limned in Veblen’s Theory of the 
Leisure Class over a century ago: consumption and produc-
tion. In the qualitative portion of the study, I found that 
women believed themselves to be most knowledgeable 
about the consumer products sector of the economy, and 
thus the bulk of their purchase recommendations to their 
clubs were for consumer products stocks. Men, in contrast, 
recommended stocks to their clubs based on their profes-
sional expertise: for example, in one all-men’s club I stud-
ied, the bus driver persuaded the club to buy oil company 
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stocks, the doctor recommended pharmaceutical stocks, 
and the engineer recommended the stocks of engineering 
firms. Curiously, though most of the women in my study 
worked outside their homes, I never saw them use their 
professional experience as a source of investing ideas, as 
their male counterparts did. In contrast, I did see men 
explicitly discuss and reject investment in the consumer 
products section of the economy, usually based on a 
vaguely-articulated but evidently shared understanding 
that it was unseemly for men to invest in that area of the 
economy! 
I was amazed to find these results substantiated by my 
quantitative data. In analyzing the detailed portfolio re-
cords obtained through the national survey, I found that 
the percentage of stocks investment clubs allocated to 
consumer products firms was directly proportional to the 
number of women in the club. Thus, all-men’s clubs had 
the lowest proportion of their assets invested in consumer 
products stocks, while all-women’s clubs held the largest 
proportion of their funds in consumer products stocks, and 
mixed clubs were in the middle, allocating investment 
dollars to consumer products stocks in direct proportion to 
the percentage of women members. 
I dubbed this phenomenon “the logic of gender appropri-
ateness,” and argued that it – along with socially responsi-
ble investing – were the outcomes of the “new investor 
class” importing their worldview as consumers into the 
stock market. They were, literally, retail investors. Most 
importantly, their choices are redefining “shareholder 
value” with significant implications for the ways that pub-
licly-traded firms operate. 
The “Diversity Premium” in Portfolio Performance 
This study was catalyzed by a puzzle: according to data 
collected by a national association of investment clubs, the 
stock portfolios of clubs composed of men and women 
together earned significantly higher rates of return than 
the portfolios of clubs composed of men only or women 
only. Analyzing all 12 years’ worth of portfolio perform-
ance data that were available as of 1998, when I em-
barked on the study, I found that the annual rate of return 
on investment for mixed groups was higher than that of 
their single-sex counterparts. 
Specifically, mixed groups earned about two percent more 
on their investments than single-sex groups. While two 
percent may not sound like much, the process of com-
pounding results in large differences over time. Through 
compounding, investment clubs earn interest on their 
interest, as well as on the cash they contribute each 
month, so that a two percent premium can result in many 
thousands of dollars in additional profits. It was also sur-
prising to note the absence of any statistically significant 
difference between the performance of all-male clubs and 
all-female clubs, suggesting that neither men nor women 
were better investors, but rather that gender diversity itself 
made a distinct contribution to group performance. 
The findings were unexpected for two reasons. First, eco-
nomic theory would suggest that the personal characteris-
tics of investors (such as gender) should make no differ-
ence in the performance of their stocks. Second, sociologi-
cal research has repeatedly shown that compositional di-
versity in task groups causes decreased performance more 
often than not. Yet the positive effects appeared robust in 
this data set, and I set out to uncover the origins of the 
“diversity premium.” 
Using both the qualitative and quantitative parts of my 
study, I found that the “diversity premium” had two 
sources. The first was the different orientations that men 
and women have to the stock market (sketched in the 
previous set of findings), which meant that mixed groups 
had larger and more diverse sources of investing informa-
tion than single-sex groups. Second, social ties among 
members of single-sex groups were quite different than 
those in mixed groups, affecting the quality of their deci-
sion processes. Consistent with an extensive literature on 
group composition, all-men’s and all-women’s groups 
were overwhelmingly composed of social friends, while 
mixed groups were primarily composed of colleagues who 
knew each other through work and school – the institu-
tions where men and women are most likely to cross paths 
and form ties. For the sake of their friendships, members 
of single-sex groups tended to “rubber stamp” each 
other’s investment ideas, inhibiting candid and rigorous 
analysis of the investing ideas members proposed. In con-
trast, mixed groups generally developed out of settings like 
offices and classrooms, in which disagreement was toler-
ated, or even encouraged. As a result, mixed groups not 
only had norms of constructive debate, but had less to lose 
socially from such discussions than their same-sex counter-
parts; this produced more considered, and more profitable 
investment decisions. Thus, while few investment clubs got 
rich – most underperformed the market index (the S&P 
500) by about 20 percent, like 75 percent of professional 
investment managers13 – groups composed of men and 
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women together consistently earned higher returns on 
their investments. 
Investment Clubs as Micro-Finance for the Developed 
World 
Investment clubs as an organizational form bear a striking 
resemblance to another mode of economic self-help: mi-
cro-finance groups, such as rotating credit associations 
(ROSCAs). Both investment clubs and ROSCAs are volun-
tary associations in which members make monthly cash 
contributions to a collective enterprise designed to build 
their economic independence. Such organizations have a 
significant economic impact in developing countries; for 
instance, a number of micro-finance associations have 
gone well beyond lending money, extending into invest-
ment in commodities such as steel roofing material or even 
currency equivalents. Some rotating credit associations in 
Africa are reported to hold assets in excess of U.S. $1 mil-
lion, and many have developed elaborate governance 
structures.14 
To find essentially the same techniques in use by middle-
class citizens of one of the world’s most economically-
developed nations is a startling irony produced by a gen-
eration-long unraveling of institutions designed to provide 
collective economic goods. Like micro-finance organiza-
tions in developing countries, investment clubs in the 
United States address needs that are not met by the state 
or financial institutions. But while micro-credit associations 
primarily serve the poor, the techniques of “frontier cap-
italism” are being used by Americans who are far better 
off economically, but who have real concerns about sink-
ing into poverty through holes in the social safety net. 
With 80 percent of members saying that their primary 
investing objective is to save enough to support themselves 
after 65, the investment club phenomenon can be read as 
an indicator of the degree to which stratification by wealth 
has shredded our social safety net.15  
Social Capital and Civil Society 
As voluntary, communal undertakings involving millions of 
people, investment clubs are a significant part of the asso-
ciational life of the United States. They may also counter 
some of the dangers Putnam warns about in his portrait of 
declining civic life in America. Civil society thrives by bridg-
ing demographic and other boundaries, and investment 
clubs certainly provide the resources that to Putnam define 
civic engagement: “trust, norms and networks that can 
improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated 
action.”16  
In addition, as Habermas argues in his theory of “commu-
nicative action,” such voluntary associations help members 
become “more competent members of modern societies” 
by teaching them to engage in constructive argumenta-
tion.  Characteristics of such groups include: 
 Decision processes in which conflicts are resolved solely 
by the “force of the better argument” 
 Cooperation in defining and achieving shared goals 
 An equal voice in the process for all group members, 
including the ability to introduce proposals or call others’ 
proposals into question 
 The absence of threats to free and equal expression of 
ideas17 
The case of investment clubs very closely approximates 
Habermas’ vision of an “ideal speech situation.” Learning 
to be an investor through the vehicle of investment clubs, 
as opposed to outside of a group context, has the secon-
dary consequence of teaching the “communicative ethics” 
and discursive rules on which Habermas argues civil soci-
eties are built. Moreover, investment clubs provide a finan-
cial incentive for this behavior: the “diversity premium,” 
which rewards those who engage in the common task 
across demographic boundaries. In this sense, there is 
reason for optimism about the flourishing of investment 
clubs, and their potential to repair some of the damage 
done to civil society in the U.S. in recent years. 
Future Directions 
To some, the technological advances that have permitted 
stock exchanges to operate without human traders, and 
individuals to trade without brokers, might make face-to-
face groups like investment clubs seem like quaint anach-
ronisms, irrelevant both for practice and for scholarly re-
search. However, there are several reasons to think other-
wise. In practical terms, the most important financial deci-
sions in the world are made, and will continue to be made, 
in small group settings. For example, many of the most 
important decisions affecting the U.S. economy are made 
in small groups such as the Federal Open Markets Commit-
tee – a group of bankers who set interest rates and fiscal 
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4 For a review, see Chancellor, Edward, 1999:. Devil Take the 
Hindmost: A History of Financial Speculation. New York: Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux. 
policy – as well as the numerous investment committees 
that decide how to spend the money of America’s corpora-
tions and non-profits. Investment clubs are worthy of study 
in their own right, but they are also valuable to investigate 
as instantiations of an important socio-economic practice 
which has received very little attention from social scien-
tists. 
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Recent reforms of European pension schemes have largely 
taken the American system as a reference. The principle of 
partial financing by private pension funds came to be privi-
leged during the stock market's euphoric phase in the 
1990s.  Since the plunge of the market in 2001, however, 
the suitability of that model in Europe has not really been 
called into question, in spite of a succession of social and 
economic letdowns in the United States. The remarks which 
follow are aimed at understanding the origins of such a 
persistent belief in the virtues of the pension funds. The 
analysis brings out the role played by their legal structure, 
the trust, in the legitimisation of the ‘pension industry’.1 
The Key Element of Legitimisation: The 
Trust 
The thesis developed here is that the unwavering support 
for the pension funds is based on a forceful but largely 
unconscious belief, according to which these funds would 
be capable of encompassing and reconciling two antago-
nistic logics, that of social protection and that of financial 
speculation. It is easy to understand the political interest of 
such a belief, which would make pension funds one of the 
solutions to the contradictions of European integration, 
acting as the main players in economic growth based on 
the financial market, characteristic of US finance-led capi-
talism, and, at the same time, potential candidates for the 
creation of a European social model more in keeping with 
the aspirations of the Social Democratic tradition. 
The pension funds come under social protection to the 
extent that they are intended to supplement employee 
pension schemes. They are also essential participants on 
the financial markets and are permeated by the financial 
logic. But these two logics are contradictory in terms of 
ends and means alike. Social protection was developed in 
the 19th century to offer wage-earners security in face of 
the economic uncertainties proper to their situation. It is 
aimed at isolating them from economic fluctuations by 
creating social rights, which are different from property 
rights (Castel 1995). Finance, on the contrary, is party to 
economic fluctuations: its objective is systematic risk-taking 
through wagers on the future which are largely internal to 
the financial community.2 It functions on the basis of the 
circulation of property rights. 
The pension funds would supposedly achieve a synthesis of 
these opposites: their administrators lay claim to long-term 
management adapted to the purpose of retirement fund-
ing. Their discourse gives a central role to the presumed 
virtues of the fiduciary responsibility which they are re-
quired to assume, and the trust’s investment rules. 
In fact, analysis shows that the trust is not limited to a 
rhetorical stand but, in accordance with the requirements 
of justification (Boltanski/ Thévenot 2006), actually con-
tributes to organising the ‘pension industry’ sector. Distinct 
from contract and corporation alike, it initially depended 
on a particular legal system, equity, which is different from 
common law. Over time, case law engendered its own 
corpus of rules and constituted a veritable model of finan-
cial behaviour which is imposed on all the actors in the 
investment chain.3 It impregnated the workings of the 
financial world, which has made considerable use of it. 
And reciprocally, it has become the receptacle for the 
transformations of finance. In this sense, contemporary 
finance is ‘determined’ by the trust’s legal categories. 
The pension funds have inherited a certain form of eco-
nomic organisation and behavioural guarantees from the 
trust. The underlying message conveyed by their promoters 
is that, because the trust, in its generic, ancestral form, 
was intended to ensure the management of the wealth of 
a minor placed under supervision, it is capable today, in its 
financial form, of efficiently protecting the group of unin-
formed savers constituted by employees. The legitimisation 
of the pension funds hinges on finance's appropriation of 
this protective heritage. 
We shall thus examine the nature of the protection offered 
by the trust. Adopting an analytical approach, we shall first 
identify its constituent principles and their legal interpreta-
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tion and then measure their impact on financial behav-
iours.4 
The Nature of Protection in the Trust 
The trust is protective first of all in the sense that it is a 
mechanism of supervision. It began as a medieval ar-
rangement which permitted the knight setting out on a 
crusade to place his fief in the hands of a peer, who was 
then bound to look after the family’s upkeep. It gradually 
became the instrument of English law which organises the 
transmission of inheritance within wealthy families and 
most recently, has been adopted by employers to structure 
pension funds. Whatever the kind of situation involved, the 
trust always reveals the same need: transmitting wealth to 
legatees considered incapable of managing it themselves. 
It meets this need through the introduction of a third 
party, the trustee, who is responsible for administering the 
holdings for the beneficiary. But this mechanism is ambiva-
lent. On the one hand, it is eminently protective since it 
protects the beneficiaries, even against themselves. But on 
the other hand, it is a source of danger because it grants 
considerable powers to the trustee, notably that of dispos-
ing of the property. 
When the trust is created, there is a transfer of the owner-
ship of the goods towards the trustee, who then has a 
legal right over them. This is the major difference from the 
French legal system, which also organises management for 
third parties, but without the transfer of property. The 
trustee’s appropriation permits a very broad delegation of 
management. The beneficiaries' subjection is total: they 
must rely on the trustees and generally have neither the 
power to dismiss them nor the means to monitor them or 
influence their decisions. 
This asymmetry of power has been a source of major con-
flicts. At the outset, the Church’s social power permitted 
disputes to be settled. In the 14th century, the English 
sovereign created a specific equity court, which proposed 
remedies absent from common law in cases where moral 
doctrine required it, essentially when what was involved 
was forcing the strong party (the trustee) to honour com-
mitments with regard to the weak one (the beneficiary 
who was a minor). While common law arbitrated between 
parties of the same social rank who were equally capable 
of asserting their rights, equity took into account the 
weakness of one of them. It dispensed justice in the name 
of a higher principle, justness, with the sovereign held to 
be its legitimate bearer. It was thus opposed to common 
law according to the Aristotelian distinction between uni-
versal justice of a divine or political nature and individual 
justice (Duggan 1998). 
The protective dimension of the trust is thus guaranteed by 
this legal exteriority which superimposes its own supervi-
sion over that of the trustee and acts in the name of moral 
doctrine and later, public order. This political origin re-
emerges in the United States with the 1974 Employment 
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) on the pension 
funds. This federal intervention in the form of a statute, 
atypical in a country of common law which generally pre-
fers an elaboration of standards through case law, reaf-
firmed that the protection of rights to a pension scheme in 
the pension funds depends on the political order as well as 
the market order. The origin of the trust thus demonstrates 
that it is a private, tutelary mechanism regulated by legal 
intervention and political logic, which, from an analytical, 
historical standpoint,5 makes it a valid institutional candi-
date for organising a form of social protection. 
The Metamorphoses of the Investment 
Standard 
The specific protection provided by the trust may also be 
measured in terms of the way the holdings are managed. 
History shows the extent to which the investment standard 
has changed in function of the social uses of the trust and 
the markets on which the assets are invested. 
Given that the main objective is to avoid the alienation of 
the holdings by a disloyal trustee, the earliest investment 
rules were aimed at limiting transfers. The earmarking of 
holdings placed in trust was thus intended to inform any 
buyer of their fiduciary value, in order to make that person 
assume the fiduciary responsibility (Bogert 1987). The trac-
ing procedure permitted the successive exchanges and 
transformations of the holdings to be re-established so 
that these could be restored to the beneficiary in case of 
abusive transfer. Since these rules reduced the speed of 
the circulation of the assets and thus their liquidity, they 
limited their market interest, and many financial intermedi-
aries refused to get involved in holding such assets. By 
restricting liquidity, these original provisions did not en-
courage speculation, but they created a separate market. 
The financial players thus sought to get around them and 
in the United States, they were gradually abandoned in the 
early 20th century. 
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The second objective of the trust is to channel the trustee 
towards a kind of management which is in keeping with 
the transmission of holdings. Consequently, trustees are 
subject to a duty of prudence which should guide their 
investment choices. As defined by the courts in the 19th 
century, prudence of investment consisted of safeguarding 
the capital and seeking regular income. In addition, some 
states restricted the spectrum of authorised securities to 
government loans and mortgages, through legislation or 
regulations. They were thus responding to the concern for 
protecting beneficiaries from speculators as well as that for 
guaranteeing their own financing in the process. This pol-
icy was passed on by the courts, which explicitly prohibited 
speculation, although they had a hard time defining ex-
actly what that entailed and limited themselves to exclud-
ing certain kinds of securities from the trusts. This conser-
vative interpretation of prudence was maintained by the 
trust code, known as the Restatement of Trusts, until 1992 
(Halbach 1992). A conceptual breakthrough was marked, 
however, with the 1974 ERISA, which privileges the con-
cepts of diversification and portfolio risk borrowed from 
the modern portfolio theory. Developed by the academic 
community and promoted by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and the Department of Labour (DOL, 
responsible for enforcing ERISA), this theory slowly made 
its way among financiers during the 1970s (Bernstein 
1995). 
Its watchword, portfolio diversification extended to the 
entire constellation of disposable assets, opened the pen-
sion funds up to financial innovations. It took the opposite 
path from that of trust law, which, on the contrary, en-
couraged the individualised selection of investments on the 
basis of their substance (Langbein 1996). But the courts 
were slow in adopting this new vision of investment 
(Gordon 1987). Thus, until the 1980s, the standard of 
prudence in use was hardly favourable to financial innova-
tions and constituted an obstacle to the forms of specula-
tion derived from them. 
Despite its total opposition to the substantive prudence of 
the Restatement of Trust, the modern portfolio theory was 
able to draw on another tradition of interpretation based 
on the Prudent Man standard laid down by the Massachu-
setts Court decision in Harvard College v. Amory (1830). 
This decision was pronounced in the context of the emerg-
ing industry of Boston professional trustees who were 
administering the financial assets portfolios of wealthy East 
Coast foundations and industrial dynasties (Friedman 
1985). Capable of assuming greater risks than the other 
trustees, they developed specific knowledge which could 
not be recognised by the substantive standard in force 
(Langbein 1995). The prudent man rule met this need by 
defining the quality of an investment in a procedural rather 
than a substantive way, relative to the behaviour of a pru-
dent man handling his own affairs. It thus added to the 
existing substantive standard (no speculation, permanent 
availability of funds) a procedural standard aimed at de-
scribing the “way” of handling. 
The prudent man rule is a means of defining fiduciary 
responsibility in a procedural way, i.e., by insisting on the 
compliance of the decision-making process more than on 
the result obtained. However, the nature of this fictitious 
being created by the courts still limited his decision-making 
to a moral universe. In fact, the prudent man is a being 
attached to a community and he acts in accordance with 
the latter’s values. This rule thus permits the referent of the 
investment decision to be rooted in a typical behaviour, the 
logic of which is financial but which is also a socially ac-
cepted and morally just behaviour. 
The community of trustees came to replace the political 
and legal authorities in the regulation of trust investments. 
But it still did not permit a diversity of behaviours. By defin-
ing the good investment standard for all trustees, it tended 
to make their behaviours converge. It was thus the source 
of the mimetic behaviours which were to be identified 
much later among the trustees. Today, such mimicking is 
considered a source of speculation. For a long time, how-
ever, the prudent man rule avoided excessive risk-taking to 
the extent that it favoured the owner’s ‘reasonable’ behav-
iour. 
Finance's Take-over within the Trust 
The 1974 ERISA marked a turning point insofar as it re-
placed the figure of the prudent man by that of the pru-
dent expert. The distinction is essential: the prudent expert 
is a professional, not a good father. Concretely, this new 
legal being was constituted at the time of the transforma-
tion of the money-management industry in the late 1960s. 
The widespread break-up of financial institutions thus 
went hand in hand with the increased delegation of in-
vestment to money management firms.6 The pension 
funds were part of this development. To organise this 
delegation, investment management consulting firms of-
fered to assist the pension funds in selecting their investment 
managers. A community of professionals thus emerged and 
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became aware of its collective identity under the term 
“money-management community”.7 And in fact, what this 
community proposed was consistent with the earlier pro-
cedural framework of trust law which required a commu-
nity of reference in order to be able to judge the trustees’ 
practices. Finance thus became the new community of 
reference, a legitimate source for setting out the ‘good’ 
practices. 
This transfer of power to the investment managers was 
politically desirable for the United States government, 
which saw it as a means of protecting employees, the 
beneficiaries of the pension funds, against the arbitrariness 
of the employer-trustee. It was also a means of developing 
the autonomy of the financial industry. The 1974 ERISA 
thus accomplished what was then the necessary revision of 
the trust’s legal categories. Three definitions were essential 
for prying beneficiaries loose from the supervision of the 
employer-trustee and attaching them to the financial in-
termediaries: the beneficiary’s interest, the attribution of 
responsibilities and the prudence of investment standard. 
The exclusive benefit rule defined the participant’s interest 
in the pension fund on the model of a shareholder’s strictly 
financial interest. This interest is doubly isolated: on the 
one hand, from those of the other parties, be they em-
ployer, trade union or trustee, and on the other, from the 
employees’ interests other than that of seeking the optimal 
financial return. 
Before this rule, the trust’s investment decision-making was 
still situated in a legal context where several levels of argu-
ments could be invoked.8 The courts accepted a holistic 
conception of investment within which obtaining a short-
term financial return was not the trustees’ sole preoccupa-
tion. The definition of the beneficiaries’ interest could en-
compass their status as wage-earners and citizens. The man-
agement policy for the funds could be oriented by social 
considerations such as the granting of low-interest loans to 
employees, the funding of social housing, or economic 
considerations such as transactions aimed at developing 
the local economy or ensuring an outlet downstream for 
the firm concerned. These transactions could even be 
made at the price of a lower return than that of the mar-
ket. These different uses of the assets held in the pension 
funds were economic but were not entirely controlled by 
the financial markets. 
In the name of the protection of the beneficiaries and 
against the vicissitudes of such management, ERISA limited 
the beneficiary’s interest to the financial return procured 
by the financial market (Fischel/ Langbein 1988). This 
meant that there was no other possible place for the in-
vestment of the pension funds’ assets because the return 
on the investment had to be equal to that of a comparable 
investment, i.e., with the same risk, available on the mar-
ket at the time of the investment.9 The return, which was 
initially only the result of various investment techniques, 
thus became a goal to be attained. With the privileging of 
this criterion, the decision-making process for investment 
was in some ways reversed: the return became a pure 
category applied to all the pension funds. 
This normative vision found a way of imposing itself with 
the wave of hostile takeover bids in the 1980s. It allowed 
the sanctioning of employer practices which consisted of 
using the assets held in the funds to counter the takeover 
bids faced by American firms. The employees got some-
thing out of it because the failure of a hostile bid often 
meant that their jobs were saved (Roe 1994). In the name 
of ERISA, however, the DOL prosecuted the players using 
this strategy. 
The second legal transformation consisted of authorising 
and encouraging the delegation of the investment function 
to investment managers. This delegation imposed a new 
definition of fiduciary responsibility. Traditionally, the trus-
tee’s responsibility was far-reaching: it bore on all the tasks 
carried out, and in case of disputes, its assessment was left 
up to the courts. ERISA broke this overall responsibility into 
separate ones transmitted to the proxies. It thus increased 
the number of potential trustees but limited their responsi-
bility to the strict function assumed in the name of the 
delegation. The result was a functional clarification which 
met the criticism levelled at traditional responsibility as a 
“catch-all”. But the network organised by the functional 
division of responsibility sometimes left holes. Thus, a whole 
group of players escaped an attribution of responsibility 
and this situation could lead to legal interpretations offer-
ing less protection to the beneficiaries than the provisions 
of trust law prior to ERISA. 
The third modification bears on the definition of the stan-
dard of prudence. The text of the law, and the DOL’s sub-
sequent interpretations, actively introduced the modern 
portfolio theory, in spite of the resistance of the main play-
ers, employers, financiers and judges (Longstreth 1986; 
Gordon 1987). Concretely, this conceptual displacement 
permitted the justification of investments previously pro-
hibited because they were judged too risky: junk bonds, 
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stripped bonds, foreign stocks, derivatives and so on. It 
thus constituted a factor of increased risk-taking. But at 
the same time, it justified the spread of a second style of 
investment management, passive portfolio management. 
This approach is aimed at replicating the performance of a 
financial index and for the trustees, constitutes a good 
placement: obtaining a return in line with that of the mar-
ket confirms that they have acted as “prudent men”, in 
accordance with their fiduciary duties. Thus, the new con-
cept of prudence justified two management behaviours at 
the same time: so-called active management can legiti-
mately undertake investments riskier than those previously 
permitted, while passive portfolio management, on the 
contrary, reduces the risk on the portfolio return. Today, 
trustees use a mix of these two management styles. 
A System of Justification, “Procedural 
Delegation” 
The law has thus reconfigured its conception of the protec-
tion of the beneficiary with the arrival of investment man-
agers in the pension funds. The transformation set off by 
ERISA is system-wide: it does not just do away with the 
prohibitions established by a few specific rules, which pre-
vented a financial logic from dominating investment deci-
sions. Rather, it directly establishes this logic by providing a 
legal rationalisation for the pension industry's system of 
social organisation. And it contributes to that system’s 
legitimacy by making it consistent with the bases of the 
trust. 
Given the metamorphoses which ERISA has imposed on 
the rules of trust law, we might well ask ourselves what 
actually remains of the trust’s essence. In our view, its 
heritage lies in the fact that the present organisation of the 
pension industry relies on a principle which is at the basis 
of trust regulation: the obligation for the strong parties 
(trustees) to justify themselves with regard to the weak 
ones (beneficiaries) under the control of the judge. This 
requirement of justification was already expressed in the 
1830 procedural definition of prudence of investment. It 
re-emerges today, among investment managers and trus-
tees alike, in the form of obligations to document the 
decisions made, to have an investment process which can 
be explained to a third party. Accountability has become 
the watchword with regard to the results obtained as well 
as the procedures used. 
A disclosure concept already existed in trust law and it was 
updated by ERISA in order to monitor and co-ordinate the 
delegation chain by requiring each link to provide informa-
tion about its procedures.10 But rather than adopting the 
traditional obligation which encouraged players to disclose 
any anomaly detected, the law limits disclosure to those 
anomalies stemming from the task accepted. No one is 
encouraged to reveal problems concerning another part of 
the delegation chain. Our analysis of ERISA case law from 
1980 to 2000 shows that the detection of a substantive 
anomaly, even if it seemed disturbing in the eyes of the 
person discovering it, did not in itself constitute a warning 
sign except to prejudice the procedures leading to it (Mon-
tagne 2006). ERISA has thus helped to establish a system 
of organisation which I would term “procedural delega-
tion”. This consists of extensive delegation to investment 
managers, whom the trustees oversee by verifying the 
means implemented, without imposing a performance 
bond but by multiplying the number of providers placed in 
competition. 
Such regulation based on the compliance of the proce-
dures reflects a metamorphosis of the trust’s protective 
function. The traceability of the exchanges, which used to 
prevent management abuses by earmarking assets, has 
been replaced by the monitoring of individual behaviour. 
Justification through procedures is an organisational de-
scendent of the old rules of protection which, although 
they have been changed or have disappeared, remain 
active by modelling economic organisation. The players 
have lost sight of the legal origin of their behaviour. Thus 
the sector-based organisation in a form of “procedural 
delegation” constitutes a kind of residue of trust law on 
finance.11 
The Real Nature of “Fiduciary 
Capitalism” 
What are the results of this legal and socio-economic 
transformation? The principle of management under trus-
teeship has clearly been revised by ERISA with the aim of 
increasing the protection of pension-fund beneficiaries 
through the professionalisation of financial management. 
But by imposing the condition of due care rather than a 
performance bond, the law pushes the trust’s “mission 
impossible” to the limit: ensuring the protection of the 
weak by requiring the strong to justify themselves. The 
display of procedures thus serves as the means of monitor-
ing the powerful, who themselves remain individually sub-
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ject to a higher power, the financial community. But the 
expected protection, a predefined retirement pension, is 
no longer ensured. The whole of the delegation system 
offers no guarantee: it does not ensure financial perform-
ance but simply provides a guarantee of compliance with 
commonly accepted procedures. This limitation of respon-
sibility, characteristic of “procedural delegation”, is a re-
curring component of the functioning of finance, which is 
based on intermediaries who provide “non-binding ad-
vice” and whose fiduciary responsibility has been attenu-
ated.12 
Ultimately, the legal transformation of the trust contributes 
to the legitimisation of finance. On the one hand, it makes 
employees’ financial risk-taking acceptable by redefining 
fiduciary protection.13 On the other, it reinforces the posi-
tion of the financial intermediaries: the blocking of em-
ployee savings in the trust gives them control over liquidity 
on the financial markets without any legal constraints to 
achieve a substantive performance. Fiduciary capitalism 
does not mark the advent of a new compromise between 
wage-earners and capital but rather, a renewed form of 
the seizure of fiduciary power by institutional investors and 
a new stage in the history of the expansion of finance. 
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Endnotes 
1 This article has been drawn from a more extensive treatment of 
the subject in  Les fonds de pension entre protection sociale et 
spéculation financière (Odile Jacob, 2006). Translation: Miriam 
Rosen. 
2 This vision of finance is the one developed by André Orléan in 
the tradition of Keynes and Kaldor. It closely links liquidity and 
speculation. Indeed, the main aim of the financial market is liquid-
ity and the mechanisms sustaining it contribute to an overall 
coherence described as the “financial logic”. But considering the 
firm as a liquid asset means giving it a value in view of resale, and 
any operation motivated by the anticipation of an imminent price 
fluctuation is considered to be speculative. 
3 Not only are the pension funds organised in trusts but also part 
of the mutual funds, according to a 1996 survey carried out by 
the Investment Company Institute (ICI 1996). 
4 In the remarks which follow, I am adopting a conception of the 
relations between law and economics derived from the institu-
tionalist tradition initiated by Commons, the economic sociology 
of Fligstein and the Regulation Theory (Boyer 2007 forthcoming). 
5 The double nature of social protection, economic and political, 
is theorized by the structuralist approach of B. Théret (1996:451-
459). 
6  For an account of how the sector was set up, see Clowes 
(2000). The author was the editor-in-chief of Pension & Invest-
ments. 
7 The founding of the magazine Institutional Investors in 1967 
with the aim of informing institutional investing players is a sign 
of the recognition of this sector as such. The appearance of in-
vestment management consulting firms, performance measure-
ment services and investment counselling departments also hel-
ped to define the sector's boundaries. 
8 A plurality of worlds of justification as described by (Boltanski/ 
Thévenot 2006).  
9 According to the DOL’s 1994 provisions. 
10 Cf. the duty to alert in (Zanglein/ Stabile 2005: 609). 
11 This is what Bernard Lepetit calls “an imperfect reinterpreta-
tion giving rise to a new meaning” (Lepetit 1995: 297). 
12  Cf. the functioning of auditing firms and rating agencies 
(Mutti 2004). 
13 This risk-taking is proper to the new forms of defined contri-
bution pension schemes known as 401k, which replaced the 
traditional funds in the 1980s. 
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Introduction 
Contemporary financial markets are grafted onto complex 
technological structures, which affect transactions rules 
and roles, in ways in which go well beyond increased ve-
locity or improved access to data. This has led several 
scholars to talk about the technological constitution of 
financial markets (e.g., Knorr Cetina 2005; Muniesa 2003; 
Zaloom 2006; Knorr Cetina and Bruegger 2002; MacKenzie 
and Millo 2003). 
Intrinsic to this constitution is boundary-marking: i.e., the 
procedures (Gieryn 1999) through which markets are clas-
sified with respect to other social institutions. I will attempt 
here to explore this aspect by examining an empirical case: 
the role played by price-recording technologies in the con-
stitution of a national securities market in the US. In the 
first step, I examine the concept of boundary and relate it 
to the agential features of technology. The second step 
deals with the boundaries of financial exchanges existing 
before the introduction of the first custom-tailored price-
recording technologies. The third step shows how technol-
ogy use triggered definitional shifts which reverberated in 
legal and political domains. 
Boundary-marking and Technology 
Boundaries are procedures employed by actors in delineating 
domains of activity and in making legitimate identity claims. 
The system of professions, for instance, consists in a set of 
boundaries, which mark interrelated jurisdictions. They com-
prise categories of activity, knowledge, and skills, together 
with privileged and socially controlled access to these activi-
ties (Abbott 1988). Boundaries establish domains within 
which the status of a body of knowledge appears as legiti-
mate; epistemic claims are subjected to particular, domain-
specific verification procedures, acknowledged by the com-
munity as appropriate (e.g., Knorr Cetina 1999: 111). 
In some cases, boundary-marking implies the mobilization 
of heterogeneous actors, with different interests, skills, and 
standpoints (Leigh Starr 1989). This occurs, among others, 
when definitional uncertainties arise. Sometimes, classifica-
tions and categories resulting from this process become 
legal categories (Jasanoff 1995). 
Boundary-marking is not exclusively grounded in the pro-
duction of legal or scientific texts, or in debates. In many 
instances, boundary-marking implies a mix of discursive 
and non-discursive procedures, of explicit argument and 
tacit skills, as well as the mobilization of technology 
(Bowker and Leigh Star 1999). This can become the basis 
for definitional arrangements and for the mobilization of 
groups involved in classifications and in boundary-marking. 
Michel Callon and Fabian Muniesa (2005: 1229) have ar-
gued that markets are collective calculative devices, which 
operate under uncertainty and generate compromises about 
the nature of goods and their value. Accordingly, markets 
are technological arrangements, comprising formulae and 
artifacts which project paths of action. These arguments 
highlight the agential features of technology, its standardiz-
ing capabilities, and definitional power: technologies intro-
duce distinctions and classifications which endow exchange 
items with specific properties. 
In certain situations at least, uncertainties and/or ambigui-
ties can arise with respect to an institution as a whole. 
Institutions like stock exchanges do not always have clear-
cut social and legal statuses. They can be several things at 
once – e.g., private associations, yet openly accessible 
trading places. They can lack a precise legal definition, or 
have a legal status at odds with access and control issues. 
This can entail both legal and practical problems with re-
spect to the character, status, and validity of contracts, to 
exchange procedures, and to the roles taken by market 
actors. 
Definitional uncertainties can be expressed in unclear legal 
statuses, or in clashes and controversies surrounding finan-
cial transactions. The absence of a legal frame (or an am-
biguous one) would lead to controversies about the status 
of transactions, access to financial data, and data owner-
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ship, among others. Such clashes would entail the mobili-
zation of non-financial groups and institutions in the defini-
tional process, like courts of law and legal scholars. When 
technology becomes a resource in boundary marking, engi-
neers and technology firms become engaged in the process 
of maintaining and consolidating institutional definitions 
and boundaries, along with regulators, legal scholars, and 
brokers. Definitional processes mobilize legal, technical, 
and professional authorities, which are brought together in 
a “trading zone” (Galison 1996). 
What is then the link between technology and the defini-
tional problems facing stock exchanges? I will turn now to 
examining this starting from a short discussion of the legal 
aspects of financial transactions, and of the way technol-
ogy intervened in these problems. 
The data I use in this analysis come from legal cases and 
commentaries, reports of the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE), reports of the Securities Exchange Commission 
(SEC), and technology firms, covering the period 1905-
1963. 
The Status of Stock Exchanges 
We expect transactions to be reinforced not only by mu-
tual bonds of trust, but to have some legal backing as well: 
that is, to be acknowledged as commercial contracts and 
reinforced (if need may arise) by courts of law. Most times, 
it would not even cross our minds that financial transac-
tions could not have the status of commercial contracts. 
What we do not realize is how recent this status is: in the 
UK, transactions on the stock exchange were acknowl-
edged as commercial contracts by the Finance Act of 
1909-1910 (Poley 1926: 154). In the US, financial transac-
tions on the stock exchange were not regulated by federal 
law until the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. At state 
level, the State of New York acknowledged stock exchange 
transactions as commercial contracts only in the Personal 
Property Law of 1909, which defined a financial security as 
an instrument evidencing a right with respect to a property 
or a share (Article 7-B, Section 251, Def. 1-2). A previous 
law, adopted in 1812, declared void all contracts for the 
sale of securities which the seller did not own at the time 
of the contract (effectively banning short selling and op-
tions trading). This law was repealed in 1858 and not re-
placed by a new provision (Campbell 1922: 35). 
Several aspects impeded on the recognition of transactions 
as contracts. First, it was not clear that financial securities 
were similar in nature with other goods. Second, transac-
tions on the stock exchange were oral; usually, they were 
not followed by a written contract. During the 19th cen-
tury, brokers did not always keep transaction ledgers; they 
only wrote orders on slips of papers, which could be easily 
destroyed, lost, or forged. A certificate of stock, endorsed 
in blank, was not a negotiable instrument at common law 
(Campbell 1922: 83). Until 1922 at least, transactions 
could be repudiated by brokers before clearing or compari-
son tickets were exchanged (Campbell 1922: 11), a proc-
ess which could take several days. If repudiated, a financial 
transaction could not be reinforced in a court of law. The 
main (if not the only) enforcing mechanism was provided 
by the statutes and rules of stock exchanges, including 
codes of honor. Third, NYSE (and many other exchanges 
too) was organized as a private, self-governing association 
of voluntary members. Many legal scholars considered that 
such an association could not be regulated at the federal 
level. When the Securities Exchange Act (SEA) was passed 
in 1934, it was considered unconstitutional by some ex-
actly on this premise (Meyer 1934: 28). 
Although during the 19th century we encounter litigations 
concerning unfulfilled orders, or transactions which ran 
counter to the client’s order, there was no firm legal basis 
or prevailing legal opinion for deciding them. This was due 
to continuing uncertainties concerning the status of securi-
ties, the nature of transactions, and the possibility of regu-
lating a private, voluntary association. NYSE, however, 
took a prominent place in the public sphere. It was publicly 
accessible both by potential investors and by tourists; its 
transactions affected a large number of individuals and 
institutions; it was constantly observed by and reported in 
the media. 
Technological Innovations and 
Institutional Boundaries 
From 1867 to the early 1960s, NYSE introduced a series of 
consequential technological innovations with respect to 
price-recording and price-displaying. The first was the 
stock ticker (1867), followed by cinema screens in 1923, 
teletypes in the 1940s, and several computerized price-
recording systems in the early 1960s. 
The ticker brought together three groups of actors: official 
brokers, engineers, and telegraph companies. While bro-
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kers installed the technology in their offices, the tickers 
were owned by telegraph companies. Western Union had 
a monopoly on lines and machines, supplying them only to 
approved brokerage offices. Nevertheless, telegraph com-
panies did not own price data. The public display of and 
access to data stood in contrast to the fact that they were 
privately owned and controlled by the NYSE. 
In 1914, NYSE established a Committee on Quotations 
(imitated later by the New York Curb Exchange). The aim 
was to enforce the monopoly on price data and to “exert 
more efficiently all possible powers in their [the bucket 
shops’]1 extermination” (Meeker 1922: 339). 
Price-recording technologies led to the reorganization, role 
differentiation, and specialization on the floor of the NYSE, 
a process which was copied by other exchanges. Special-
ized trading posts were installed around stock tickers, 
which displayed only certain classes of securities. Specialist 
traders concentrated price information. Central quotation 
boards were installed: they aggregated the specialized 
price information generated around each trading post. 
Additionally (and crucially) specialist traders had exclusive 
control of their order book, which contained information 
about transactions and investors no one else could have. 
Specialist traders also acquired a trading monopoly on limit 
orders (Neill 1950:  315): they were the only ones who had 
a near real-time grasp on the flow of data enabling the 
execution of such an order. 
In 1934, the Teleregister2 Service was introduced in New 
York brokerage houses; it tabulated and displayed price 
data, replacing conventional quotations boards (The New 
York Curb Exchange 1946: 29). The data were recorded on 
paper sheets; retrieving them was still a manual operation, 
performed by armies of operators, who worked in the 
quotations department, in groups differentiated according 
to classes of securities. Each group was assigned a tele-
phone number. The broker wanting the price history of a 
certain security dialed the respective number and got the 
data from the operator (New York Curb 1931: 31). 
There was at least a double monopoly on price informa-
tion: internally, specialist traders monopolized information 
of certain classes of securities. Externally, NYSE had a mo-
nopoly on authoritative price data and on overall access to 
price-recording technologies. Brokers who were not mem-
bers of the NYSE and who operated from unofficial, 
smaller, or less reputable brokerage houses had to restrict 
themselves to unlisted securities. In 1911, Arthur B. Elliott 
founded the National Quotation Bureau (NQB), which 
compiled price and volume data from various brokerage 
offices operating in unlisted securities. The NQB centralized 
this data and produced price and volume lists (the Pink 
Sheets), sold to brokers operating over the counter (Bab-
son 1935: 138). The Pink Sheets could be accessed in bro-
kerage offices or could be subscribed to, but were not 
publicly displayed. They were privately used and owned, 
although centralizing a considerable amount of data. In 
1938, the Maloney Amendment to the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 created the National Association of Securities 
Dealers as the self-regulatory organization of over the 
counter brokers. 
An effect of electromechanical price recording and of data 
centralization on the NYSE was that it was now possible to 
produce and compile statistics about price variations and 
volume of trading. Regular3 transactions in listed securities 
on the NYSE were now recorded. This opened up the pos-
sibility of self-monitoring, but also that of being monitored 
by third parties. 
To sum up: we encounter here several boundaries that 
were reinforced by price-recording technologies. First, 
there was an institutional boundary between official and 
unofficial brokers, official and unofficial exchange systems, 
which did not exist in this form before. Second, there was 
a boundary concerning the character of price data: while 
publicly displayed, they remained privately owned and 
reinforced the private character of transactions. The tech-
nology reinforced stock exchanges as institutions which 
display to the public; yet, these institutions remained pri-
vate associations and therefore beyond public regulation. 
Public access to price data was meant to provide the 
means for and encourage participation in stock exchange 
transactions; public participation, however, could not be 
accompanied by public intervention in how transactions 
were conducted. 
Technology and Definitional Shifts 
In 1905, the case of the Board of Trade of the City of Chi-
cago v. Christie Grain and Stock Co. was brought to the 
US Supreme Court (198 U.S. 236). Christie Grain and Stock 
Co. was a bucket shop trading in options on agricultural 
commodities, among others. It should have had no access 
to the ticker prices of the Board of Trade; yet, it managed 
to get and publish them (most probably by tapping into 
telegraph wires). The Board introduced a lawsuit, which 
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went up to the US Supreme Court, where the final legal 
opinion was delivered by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 
Christie & Co. made its case on two grounds: first, while it 
was specialized in options trading, this sort of trading was 
widely practiced by the official members of the Board of 
Trade themselves. Therefore, while Christie’s activities may 
have been illegal, some activities of the Board of Trade 
were too (the Statutes of Illinois’ Criminal Law declared 
options contracts as void)4. Second, ticker prices had a 
public use, because they influenced the decisions of busi-
nessmen. Therefore, Christie’s access to price data was 
legitimate. The defense’s argument was that: “if, under 
other circumstances, there could be property in the quota-
tions, which hardly is admitted, the subject matter is so 
infected with the plaintiff’s own illegal conduct that it is 
caput lupinum, and may be carried off by any one at will.” 
In his opinion, Justice Holmes stated that members of the 
Board of Trade dealt in options only as a means of “self-
protection in business.” “The contracts made in the pits 
are contracts between the members” and fall within the 
Charter of the Board of Trade. They differ from contracts 
made with the public. “In a modern market, contracts are 
not confined to sales for immediate delivery. People will 
endeavour to forecast the future, and to make agreements 
according to their prophecy. Speculation of this kind by 
competent men is the self-adjustment of society to the 
probable. […] This court has upheld sales of stock for fu-
ture delivery and the substitution of parties, provided for 
by the rules of the Chicago Stock Exchange.” (198 U.S. 
236). Consequently, trades by (official) members of the 
exchange have a special character: they require special 
competencies and serve the greater society. 
Justice Holmes’s other argument concerned the character 
of price data generated by the ticker. This had nothing to 
do with the alleged illegality of some operations conducted 
by members of the Board: 
It seems to us an extraordinary and unlikely proposition that 
the dealings which give its character to the great market for 
future sales in this country are to be regarded as mere wagers 
or as “pretended” buying or selling, without any intention of 
receiving and paying for the property bought, or of delivering 
the property sold, within the meaning of the Illinois act. Such 
a view seems to us hardly consistent with the admitted fact 
that the quotations of prices from the market are of outmost 
importance to the business world, and not least to the farmers; 
so important, indeed, that it is argued here and has been held 
in Illinois that the quotations are clothed with a public use 
(198 U.S. 236). 
At the same time, “the plaintiff’s collection of quotations is 
entitled to the protection of the law. It stands like a trade 
secret. The plaintiff has the right to keep the work which it 
has done, or paid for doing, to itself. The fact that others 
might do similar work, if they might, does not authorize 
them to steal the plaintiff’s. […] But so far as these con-
tracts [between the Board of Trade and telegraph compa-
nies] limit the communication of what the plaintiff might 
have refrained from communicating to anyone, there is no 
monopoly or attempt at monopoly, and no contract in 
restraint of trade, either under the statute or at common 
law.” 
While price quotations remain private property, they are 
“clothed with public use.” Stock exchanges do not exer-
cise any monopoly on price data. These are private prop-
erty and confidential communication; the exchange might 
choose to make them available only to a restricted group. 
This opinion introduces a boundary between data owner-
ship and data use, grounded in the technology-based 
character of price data. Justice Holmes explicitly refers to 
“quotations of the prices continuously offered and ac-
cepted, […] collected at the plaintiff’s expense, and 
handed to the telegraph companies which have their in-
struments close at hand, and by the latter [are] sent to a 
great number of offices.” These data affect the business 
world and have public use, which does not preclude charg-
ing a price or selecting users. 
The legal acknowledgment of ticker-generated price data 
as having public use played a significant role in subsequent 
attempts to regulate financial exchanges. In 1909, when 
the Hughes Committee (set up by the US Congress) inves-
tigated allegations of monopoly, fraud, and manipulation 
on the NYSE, it refused to recommend incorporation 
(which would have opened the way for federal regulation, 
and which was bitterly opposed by the Regular Board). The 
Hughes Committee, however, acknowledged the New 
York Stock Exchange as a “national market” on the basis 
of tracking transactions: it established that 48% of all 
transactions conducted on the NYSE did not originate in 
New York City. The role of the “fully developed wire 
house” in the transformation from a local institution to a 
“national market” was also acknowledged (Meeker 1922: 
329). This sort of statistics – taken as evidence for a defini-
tional shift – would not have been possible without a 
price-recording and transmission technology. 
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In 1934, when the SEA was passed, these distinctions 
played a significant role. Federal regulation of stock ex-
changes as private associations would not have been con-
stitutional, and they strongly resisted incorporation. The 
way to regulate stock exchanges at the federal level was 
through interstate commerce and mail.5 But stock ex-
changes had to be redefined as conducting interstate com-
merce and as subject to mail regulations. This redefinition 
had two components. On the one hand, they were rede-
fined as national securities exchanges and required to 
register as such. Only registered exchanges were allowed 
to conduct business through mail and across state borders. 
Registration as a national securities exchange also meant 
that transactions had to be recorded (Meyer 1934: 15) and 
(if necessary) reported to the newly created SEC. 
This also meant redefining stock exchanges as “affected 
with a national public interest” (Meyer 1934: 28). This public 
interest could come only from the character of price data. 
Prices “are generally disseminated and quoted throughout 
the United States and foreign countries and constitute a 
basis for determining and establishing the prices at which 
securities are bought and sold, the amount of certain taxes 
owing to the United States and to the several states by 
owners, buyers, and sellers of securities, and the value of 
collateral for bank loans” (Meyer 1934: 28). This passage 
from the Section 2 of the SEA 1934 spells out how price 
quotations are of public use and affect public interest. 
Widely disseminated price data meant that both they and 
the institutions generating them were subject to federal 
regulation; indeed, the SEA specified that only registered 
stock exchanges (or members thereof) could transmit price 
quotations outside state borders (Meyer 1934: 42). The 
SEC was empowered to make rules regarding the quota-
tion of transactions and the method on recording them on 
the ticker tape (Meyer 1934: 99, 124). The SEC was also 
empowered to make rules concerning over the counter 
transactions, which did not use tickers and did not fall 
under the definition of “national markets.” The reason for 
the regulation of OTC brokerages was to prevent regis-
tered exchanges from siphoning off securities to this mar-
ket.6 
Interestingly enough, in his statement before the US Con-
gress Committee about the SEA 1934, Richard Whitney, 
the President of the New York Stock Exchange acknowl-
edged the definition of stock exchanges as public markets, 
but argued that information disclosure would transfer 
important market functions to a department of govern-
ment, and implied that these requirements would destroy 
“a free and open market” (Whitney 1934: 4). 
Technology and Boundary Evolution 
Data collection, mandated by the SEA 1934, made possible 
the analysis of price movements as the consequence of 
individual or group actions, and to investigate the social 
structure of the New York Stock Exchange both from a 
quantitative and a qualitative point of view: that is, to 
describe not only the role differentiation on the exchange 
floor, but also the volume of trade controlled by or flowing 
through certain roles. For instance, it became possible to 
calculate the volume of specialist trading versus broker 
trading, the volume of trade in regular lots vs. odd lots. It 
also became possible to investigate the social structure of 
investors dealing on the New York Stock Exchange, their 
gender, age, and professional differences. 
Up to the 1960s, the vast majority of NYSE investors were 
individual, not institutional actors. The analysis of price 
data and transactions could provide evidence about possi-
ble price manipulations undertaken by individuals, as well 
as about monopolies on the floor of the exchange. Very 
shortly after its organization, the SEC began surveys of the 
New York Stock Exchange, with the aim of devising “rules 
for the regulation of trading on exchanges” and of study-
ing “the effect of such rules on market activities and op-
erations” (SEC 1938: 21). In order to conduct these sur-
veys, the SEC distributed detailed questionnaires to all 
classes of traders and began surveillance of price data: 
“The tape quotations of the New York Stock Exchange and 
the New York Curb Exchange were under continuous ob-
servation, and complete lists of daily transactions were 
required to be furnished by all exchanges” (SEC 1938: 22). 
The SEC also conducted interviews with customers and 
assembled data on their social background (SEC 1947). 
Concomitantly, the New York Stock Exchange began con-
ducting its own surveys, partly in order to build up a coun-
terweight to the SEC’s data. 
These surveys were relatively difficult and laborious; the 
minute analysis of price movements had to be tied to 
transactions, in order to determine who bought or sold 
what, and when. A study of the possibilities for expanding 
computer recording of trading data had been already 
made in 1956, but was met with resistance by the firms 
handling odd lot trading (SEC 1963, Part 5, Ch. 6, Part E: 
93). In 1960, the NYSE had established the Department of 
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Operational Planning and Development, charged with 
pursuing computerized trading. In a survey published in 
1963, and occasioned by a market crash in May 1962, 
NYSE stated that it had set up plans for technological ex-
pansion in the early 1950s. The final aim was to develop a 
“complete data processing system” which “will mechanize 
virtually all present manual operations in the Exchange’s 
stock ticker and quotations services” ( NYSE 1963: 48-49). 
The plans were to have a system which will “automatically 
locate the latest trading data, assemble a message from a 
pre-recorded vocabulary of 126 words, and ‘speak’ it out 
over the phone to the caller – all in a few seconds” (NYSE 
1963: 49). According to this description, the technology 
required by NYSE was so unique that it offered “potential 
designers and manufacturers little opportunity for adapting 
or modifying it for use in other industries” (NYSE 1963: 
48). 
NYSE worked closely with Teleregister Co., which had 
developed the teletype machines. In the early 1960s, a 
former manager had started the Bunker Ramo Co., a com-
puter firm with links to the air defense industry. Bunker 
Ramo provided brokerage houses with computer terminals 
which in 1964 could retrieve 3 or more bits of data simul-
taneously. Additionally, NYSE had enrolled IBM to develop 
a computer system for storing and retrieving price data. 
The cooperation with IBM led to an internal report in 
1968, but the IBM plans were never implemented. Instead, 
NYSE continued the cooperation with Bunker Ramo and 
with two other firms, Scantlin Electronics and Ultronic Co. 
(Anonymous 1983: 60).7 
On its side, the Securities Exchange Commission, which 
also conducted market surveys, was interested in proce-
dures of data compilation which should allow more com-
prehensive studies, done in a speedier fashion. In April 
1963, the SEC sent to the Committee on Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce of the US Congress the Report of Spe-
cial Study of Securities Markets, a document of over 7,000 
pages. It contained a factual description of the operations 
on the NYSE’s exchange floor and of OTC brokers, a statis-
tical analysis of trading volumes and price movements, and 
a series of recommendations to the US Congress. Several 
sections were dedicated to the “possibilities of automa-
tion” in financial markets. The Special Study acknowledged 
that computer systems for the recording of price and 
transaction data were implemented in NYSE brokerages, 
and that OTC trading had also been “slightly touched” by 
automation. It stated that: 
If securities markets are to be truly public institutions, as they 
have been under the law for 30 years, the public interest in 
questions of automation must have a voice. The Commission 
should equip itself to keep abreast of electronic and computer 
developments in the securities industry. Otherwise, these may 
be neglected or suppressed for want of any consideration of the 
public interest (SEC 1963, Part 5, Ch. 6, Part E: 93). 
The SEC made to Congress the recommendations that the 
potential impact of automation is affected with public 
interest (SEC 1963, Part 5, Ch. 6, Part E: 108), and should 
be used by regulatory bodies as a surveillance technique, in 
the same way it was used by the NYSE (SEC 1963, Part 5, 
Ch. 6, Part E:  122; Ch. 12, Part B: 180). Automation was 
also recommended as a means of regulating OTC trading. 
Discussing the need to identify the “primary market mak-
ers,” the Special Study recommended that: 
Beyond this data-supplying function, a system of continuous 
classification and identification would serve as a basis for 
whatever degree of further regularization and regulation of 
over-the-counter markets may seem warranted, now or in the 
future, in what should be a continuing effort to improve and 
strengthen such markets generally” (SEC 1963, Ch. 7, Section 
F: 670). 
The definition of a public market is tied to the comprehen-
sive record of data and to the involvement of regulatory 
bodies in this process. The old boundary between floor 
trading and OTC trading, which largely depended on the 
use of price-recording technologies, is superseded by 
automation as a defining feature of markets as public 
institutions, and by the requirement to regulate them 
based on the data they produce. This marks the beginning 
of an accelerated market technologization, which will 
flourish in the late 1970s and early 1980s with the adop-
tion of the first automated trading platforms and the large 
scale expansion of computer terminals in brokerage ser-
vices. 
Conclusion 
Technologies for recording, displaying, and memorizing 
price data opened up ways of monitoring and analyzing 
“market behavior” which otherwise would not have been 
possible. 
The extensive adoption of computer technologies in the 
late 1970s has been seen by some observers as triggering 
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the deregulation of financial markets. However, the accel-
erated expansion of computer technologies was preceded 
and encouraged by regulatory involvement with data-
recording, understood as the continuation of a longer 
process of definitional transformations. 
The legal definition of price data as having public use 
opened the way for regulatory interventions, including the 
support for further technological developments in financial 
exchanges. Technology was not just an external occasion 
for legal scholars to formulate these definitions. Technol-
ogy was and continues to be the frame in which these 
distinctions maintain their validity, as well as a tool for their 
reproduction. In this sense, among others, technology did 
constitute markets as we know them today. 
Alex Preda works at the University of Edinburgh and is 
currently engaged in a research project on non-professional 
traders in electronic financial markets. 
Endnotes 
1 Bucket shops were unofficial brokerage houses, some of which 
(but not all) dealt in options; there were considerable differences 
in wealth and reputation among them.
2 The company providing the Teleregister Service was acquired 
by Martin Marietta (an air defense contractor) in the early 1960s, 
but continued to provide financial data services to members of 
the New York Stock Exchange. In 1964, the then-chairman of 
Martin Marietta, together with a computer engineer, formed the 
Bunker Ramo Co., which provided computerized data systems to 
brokerage houses (Anonymous 1983: 60).
3 Regular transactions meant transactions in lots of 100 securi-
ties or multiples thereof. Significantly, odd lot transactions were 
not recorded. All NYSE brokerage firms, bar two, transacted in 
regular lots.
4 See, for instance, Pearce v. Rice, 142 U.S. 28. 
5 Official brokers, for instance, were forbidden by the rules of the 
New York Stock Exchange to advertise business through mail, 
because this would have opened the door to federal regulation. 
Unofficial brokers, by contrast, who were not members of an 
exchange, could and did advertise by mail. 
6 This happened by transferring from listed trading securities to 
the OTC trading. Only regular lot trading was recorded on ticker 
tapes, while odd lot transactions went unrecorded. A listed secu-
rity could be withdrawn from regular lot trading, traded in odd 
lots and thus transferred to the unrecorded OTC trading. This 
allowed brokers to circumvent the monopoly and control of the 
Regular Board. Generally, it was considered that OTC brokers 
dealt only in unlisted securities, but the attention given by the SEA 
1934 to this problem indicates otherwise. The Special Study done 
by the SEC in 1963 found that 10% of the overall trading volume 
on the New York Stock Exchange was in odd lots and controlled 
by only 2 brokerage houses (SEC 1963, Ch. 6, part E: 91). 
7 Scantlin Electronics was a Western Electric subcontractor, which 
also built attenuators for the US Navy. 
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Viviana A. Zelizer is Lloyd Cotsen ‘50 Professor of Sociol-
ogy at Princeton University. She has taught at Rutgers 
University, Barnard College and Graduate Faculty of Co-
lumbia University, and Princeton University (since 1988), as 
well as held appointments at the Institute for Advanced 
Study, Russell Sage Foundation, and the École des Hautes 
Études en Sciences Sociales. She has chaired the Princeton 
Department of Sociology, chaired the economic sociology 
section of the American Sociological Association, and 
served on numerous editorial boards. She is currently a 
member of the Paris School of Economics’ Scientific Coun-
cil, the American Academy of Arts & Sciences, and the 
American Philosophical Society. She has held fellowships 
from the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation, 
the National Endowment for the Humanities, and the 
Rockefeller Foundation. 
Professor Zelizer specializes in historical analysis, economic 
processes, interpersonal relations, and childhood. She has 
published books on the development of life insurance, the 
changing economic and sentimental value of children in 
the United States, and on the place of money in social life. 
Her most recent book, The Purchase of Intimacy (Princeton 
University Press, 2005) deals with the interplay of eco-
nomic activity and personal ties, especially intimate ties, 
both in everyday practice and in the law. In addition to 
English editions, translations of her books have appeared 
in French, Japanese, Chinese, and Russian. 
1. How did you get involved in 
economic sociology? 
In a sense, I just backed into the field. For years I worked 
mainly on changes in American social life, with special 
attention to how economic processes affected it. My first 
three books dealt with the development of life insurance, 
the valuation of children, and people's uses of money. I 
thought of myself as a historical sociologist, but not in the 
grand style of comparing empires, whole economies, and 
industrial revolutions. Then scholars who clearly belonged 
to economic sociology, such as Pierre Bourdieu, Harrison 
White, and Richard Swedberg, began using my work and 
treating it as a challenge to conventional economic think-
ing. Surprised but pleased, I gladly joined debates about 
how economic processes work. By the time I published my 
Purchase of Intimacy in 2005, I was both teaching my own 
version of economic sociology and contributing regularly to 
symposia on the subject – especially when organizers wanted 
to show how economic analysts could treat culture and small-
scale interpersonal relations effectively. My students then 
drew me farther into the study of economic organizations 
and transnational economic processes. That placed me in 
the middle of discussions about the proper pursuit of eco-
nomic sociology. 
2. Could you name books or articles that 
have profoundly influenced your own 
thinking about economic sociology? 
To be honest, that is not really the way I work. My own 
approach tends to first single out a descriptive and ex-
planatory problem and then I look around for people who 
have made contributions to analyzing that problem. It is 
true that I find myself often going back to Georg Simmel’s 
work on money. Nevertheless what really matters to me 
are ways of thinking rather than specific theorists. 
3. What do you see as the main 
differences between economic sociology 
in the United States and Europe? 
Two main differences: first, that the economics to which 
Europeans are responding is quite different in emphasis, 
reflecting more of an institutional, historical, and compara-
tive background than U.S. economics; and second, that 
economic sociology connects more closely with reform and 
applied programs in Europe than it does in the U.S. My 
work with the economic sociology section of the American 
Sociological Association has led me to recognize the tense 
but potentially very fruitful dialogue Americans are carrying 
on along the same line. Despite starting out as a specialist 
in the American economy, within the section I found my-
self increasingly connecting European and American work 
in this vein (it helps that I grew up bilingual in Spanish and 
French). 
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I have recently been helping French scholars organize what 
they call the Paris School of Economics. That effort and my 
extensive contacts with other economists in the Paris re-
gion has revealed a world of scholarship in which many 
people are trying to make strong connections among 
moral theories of the economy, ideas of social change, and 
public policy. French economists and sociologists have 
moved toward the formulation of truly alternative, socially 
based description and explanation of economic activity. 
Denying any intrinsic division between sociology and eco-
nomics, for example, economist André Orléan has recently 
issued a stirring call for what we can name alternative 
accounts of economic activity in general. 
4. What are according to you the main 
current debates within the field? What 
research topics have so far been 
neglected or have not received enough 
attention? 
That’s a huge, attractive topic but it would take too many 
words to respond properly. I have already spoken out 
about these issues in my essay “Past and Futures of Eco-
nomic Sociology” which just appeared in the American 
Behavioral Scientist. As I say there, in the past years the 
field has significantly expanded. As one sign, consider the 
table of contents in Neil Smelser and Richard Swedberg’s 
(2005) second edition of their Handbook of Economic 
Sociology. It prominently features new institutionalism, 
emotions, behavioral economics, and law, all subjects ab-
sent from the first edition’s table of contents only eleven 
years earlier.  Four other new important topics are: 
 Multiple markets: from an earlier almost exclusive focus 
on production, economic sociologists are now expanding 
their analysis into other markets, especially financial mar-
kets, consumption markets, markets for personal care, and 
what they loosely call the informal economy. 
 Culture of firms: economic sociologists are finally shed-
ding their structural armor, and studying how the mean-
ingful content of social ties shapes transactions and align-
ments within firms. 
 The production and reproduction of inequality, notably 
gender inequality. Economic sociologists increasingly chal-
lenge status attainment models that account for inequali-
ties as results of encounters between biased market selec-
tion and attributes of individuals. 
 Households as intense sites of economic activity. Here 
economic sociologists, along with their allies in economics 
and anthropology, not only identify extensive, consequen-
tial production, consumption, distribution, and transfers of 
assets but also interaction patterns that defy representa-
tion as short-term spot markets. 
My recent work has responded to all of these new trends, 
notably analyses of multiple markets and of households. 
My book The Purchase of Intimacy, for instance, draws on 
most of them as it examines how people match a wide 
variety of intimate relations with economic transactions. 
Far from adopting a uniform maximizing mentality, when 
they enter the economic world people use great creativity 
in distinguishing different intimate relations from each 
other and regularly support those distinctions with differ-
entiated economic transactions. What’s more, the law 
mobilizes a parallel but not identical matching of intimate 
relations with economic transactions.  In both everyday life 
and the law, all the evidence I’ve seen challenges the 
common idea that the economy and intimacy corrupt each 
other when they come into contact. 
5. In your recent book The Purchase of 
Intimacy you devoted much of the 
evidence to American legal cases. What 
part do you see the law as playing in 
your version of economic sociology? 
Intimate relations only become legal cases in rare circum-
stances; most of the time intimately connected people 
work out their differences without litigation. By studying 
what happens when disagreements turn into lawsuits, 
however, we see how legal systems construct their own 
conceptions about how intimacy should or not mix with 
economic transactions. Those legal doctrines sometimes 
coincide with but often depart from ordinary people’s view 
about the same issues. When people go to court, their 
definitions and conceptions of what went wrong, who’s to 
blame, and what should the penalty be, have to conform 
to existing legal criteria. A person who cared for an elderly 
patient who promised her an inheritance may feel like she 
acted as the person’s child and is therefore entitled to the 
bequest. The law, however, will most likely treat her as a 
stranger and deny her request. 
Generally speaking, legal disputes evoke contending prin-
ciples and reasoning much more explicitly than parallel 
disputes within firms or households. The law, also, builds a 
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shadow theater for the conflicts of everyday life, projecting 
them starkly against the backdrop of statute and prece-
dent. Finally, legal decisions strongly and directly affect 
relationships between intimacy and economic activities as 
they intervene in such issues as the rights of same sex 
couples, the legal claims of full-time housewives when they 
divorce, the organization of baby markets, and children’s 
rights to inheritance. 
In the past few years, some of my most interesting dia-
logues have been with legal scholars critical of the law and 
economics program and therefore eager to explore new 
understandings of how the economy works, and in par-
ticular how we should go about treating the intersection of 
economic activity and intimate relations. 
6. You have advocated in your work 
that economic sociologists provide an 
alternative to explanations of economic 
life that we hear from economists. Can 
you say more about that? 
I’ve never been much of a system-builder. I prefer to use 
extensive evidence to answer concrete questions. Still, this 
line of argument leads me to think that economic sociolo-
gists should be taking three major steps that will lead them 
in somewhat different directions. First, they should aban-
don all sharp dichotomies between personal and economic 
ties. Instead they should study variations and interdepend-
ence among differentiated and meaningful social ties, 
accounting systems, media, economic transactions and 
boundaries. Second, they should also abandon the perva-
sive idea of a continuum from genuine arm’s length mar-
ket transactions to strictly non-economic transactions, with 
its implication that the market end of the continuum ex-
cludes personal considerations. Third - and no doubt more 
surprising – they should take the idea of performativity 
seriously.  Analysts of performativity have only begun to 
show precisely how economics as a discipline has shaped 
the world of corporate capitalism. Yet in the spirit of a 
cultural approach to economic life, it makes sense to sup-
pose that available cultural schemes, including academic 
disciplines, shape the ways that people carry on their eco-
nomic activities. If so, successful schemes from economic 
sociology could also have a chance of shaping how people 
conduct their economic lives. 
Overall, I can say that my main agenda has two compo-
nents: first, to put negotiated interpersonal relations di-
rectly into economic analysis and second, to recognize the 
effects of cultural variation within the same economic 
processes. We must recognize that both markets and 
households, far from reducing to rationally calculated dy-
adic transactions, involve sites of continuously negotiated, 
culturally drenched interpersonal relations. 
7. It seems important for you to 
establish a dialogue with economists. 
What are some feasible strategies to 
accomplish that? 
As it happens, the recent successes of behavioral econom-
ics, game theory, feminist economics, organizational eco-
nomics, institutional economics, and household dynamics 
have all produced welcome openings for dialogue between 
economics and sociology.  
Some economists have begun to look seriously at culture 
and social relations. Take just two recent examples. First, 
economist Robert Gibbons’ 2005 article “What is Eco-
nomic Sociology and Should any Economists Care,” in the 
Journal of Economic Perspectives. Gibbons answered yes to 
his rhetorical question, reporting that his own interest 
began “when I recognized that some sociologists were 
working with independent and dependent variables that 
were barely mentioned in the economics literature, but 
seemed potentially quite important.” Gibbons calls for a 
“Pareto-improving dialogue between the appropriate mar-
gins of economics and sociology.” 
Second, Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales, in 
a Spring 2006 article in the same journal ask “Does Cul-
ture Affect Economic Outcomes?” and also answer a re-
sounding yes. Although they do not cite economic sociolo-
gists (with the exception of rightly praising Paul DiMaggio’s 
work), they treat culture – by which they mean collective 
beliefs, identities, and preferences – seriously, not just as 
an outcome but as an independent causal factor. They 
conclude that “importing cultural elements will make eco-
nomic discourse richer, better able to capture the nuances 
of the real world, and ultimately more useful.” 
However, if they want to have a serious impact on eco-
nomics, economic sociologists cannot simply wait for 
bright-eyed economists to notice what they are doing. 
Economists pay serious attention when analysts make 
direct and cogent bids to revise existing economic analyses. 
Notice the great difference in impact by three bodies of 
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relevant innovative work that have grown up over the last 
20 years: game theory, behavioral economics, and eco-
nomic sociology itself. 
Game theory for all practical purposes has become an 
integral part of economic theory. Every economics student 
learns game theory. Game theory has made it perfectly 
legitimate to set up analyses of economic choice situations 
not as individual cognitive decision-making but as a form 
of social interaction. It’s a success story for a research pro-
gram which at one point was alien to neo-classical eco-
nomics. 
Behavioral economics, despite its remarkable success, still 
remains at a half-way point. It may well follow game the-
ory, but there is still a question whether it will fundamen-
tally modify mainline economic theory or remain a critical, 
dissident movement within economics. In a review of Ad-
vances in Behavioral Economics, Wolfgang Pesendorfer 
notes that behavioral economics “remains a discipline that 
is organized around the failures of standard economics.” 
This “symbiotic relationship with standard economics,” 
notes Pesendorfer, “works well as long as small changes to 
standard assumptions are made.” Despite the economics 
Nobel Prize shared by Vernon Smith and Daniel Kahneman, 
we have yet to see the micro-foundations of standard 
economics transformed as the behavioral economists claim 
they should be transformed. 
Economic sociology certainly has some of same potential 
as game theory or behavioral economics, but it has re-
mained far outside the conversation. So far, it attracts only 
dissidents within economics. It is certainly not something 
that economics students routinely learn about. Economic 
sociologists face an interesting choice: plunge into the core 
models of economics in the wake of game theory and 
behavioral economics, or continue their current business in 
hope that friendly economists will do the importing for 
them. 
The first choice means deploying the concepts, models, 
mathematics, and econometrics that have become econo-
mists’ stock in trade. As economist Dan Silverman points 
out for the so far incomplete success of behavioral eco-
nomics, it typically involves identifying processes that stan-
dard economic models must treat as anomalies, rewriting 
relevant economic models so they account for the anoma-
lies, and establishing the empirical validity of the revised 
models. It may also mean reducing the dialogue with the 
rest of sociology. But the second choice means remaining 
peripheral to the exciting current transformations of eco-
nomics. Given my own limited knowledge of technical 
economics and my preference for direct observation of 
economic interactions, of course, I hope that some of each 
– both integration of economic sociology into economic 
theory and sociological inquiry into economic processes – 
will happen in the foreseeable future. 
It won’t be easy, if only because the exemplary cases of 
game theory and behavioral economics involve modifica-
tion, but not elimination, of economic models’ deep indi-
vidualism. It will take great theoretical, technical, and even 
rhetorical finesse to make interpersonal processes including 
culture genuine foci of economic analysis. How will soci-
ologists rewrite economic models so that they incorporate 
the culturally drenched dynamics of organizations, house-
holds, institutions, and interpersonal ties? 
Evidence that a rapprochement is possible in principle, 
however, comes from a fourth innovative field: institutional 
economics. Economic institutionalists in the style of Doug-
lass North haven’t reshaped microeconomics to anything 
like the degree that game theorists and behavioral econo-
mists have. But they have had a profound impact on mac-
roeconomics, especially development theory. Institutional 
economists have plenty in common with institutional and 
economic sociologists: awareness of organizational proc-
esses, concerns about contract enforcement, openness to 
culture, and more. Although I hope we can continue the 
dialogue about small-scale economic processes and micro-
foundations, we also have an opportunity for an innovative 
economics-sociology alliance on the large scale. 
Right now at Princeton, in fact, Avinash Dixit, president-
elect of the American Economic Association, and I have 
been organizing a public dialogue between the two disci-
plines and it is working very well. 
8. If you remember, your first ever 
contribution to EESN was a piece about 
the gendered division of labor on 
economic sociology, which appeared in 
the summer 2000 issue. What are your 
thoughts on this issue almost seven 
years later?  
As in 2000, men still predominate in the field. However, 
largely as a result of the greater participation of feminist 
economists and household analysts in the discussions, both 
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hierarchies, networks, and markets don’t capture the or-
ganizational form of a very important range of economic 
connections. I see those connections as organizing into 
circuits combining economic interactions, accounting sys-
tems, boundaries, and meaningful interactions among 
participants – circuits of commerce. My last contribution to 
the newsletter [November 2006] outlines a program for 
investigation of just such circuits. 
women and women’s concerns have gained a significantly 
larger place in the agenda of economic sociology as a 
whole than they did seven years ago. For example, analysts 
are increasingly recognizing the economic value of unpaid 
work, typically performed by women. In my own research, 
I have been exploring two important questions: first, under 
what conditions does market based care provide adequate 
support for both the recipients and the providers of care? 
Second, to what degree is the quality of care given via the 
market and outside the market fundamentally different? 
European researchers such as Florence Weber have re-
cently been examining those very questions, which also 
concern a number of U.S. sociologists, economists, and 
philosophers. 
10. What are some other of your current 
and future research plans on economic 
sociology topics? 
As my answers to the earlier questions indicate, in recent 
times, two main topics have been preoccupying me; one of 
them is how economic circuits vary and change; the other 
is how various forms of intimacy intersect with economic 
processes. While Purchase of Intimacy focused on the in-
terplay of intimacy and economic transactions outside of 
formal economic organizations, one of my new projects 
pinpoints interactions between intimacy and organizational 
effectiveness. Another examines the operation of codes 
governing moral behavior within organizations. And as I 
already mentioned, I continue to study the provision of 
interpersonal care. 
9. Your recent writing introduces a new 
concept to economic sociology – circuits 
of commerce. Why should economic 
sociologists pay attention to circuits? 
Of course, I could be wrong, but it seems to me that stu-
dents of such economic phenomena as migrant remit-
tances, local monies, rotating credit associations, micro-
credits, personal care, corporate coalitions, and under-
ground economies indicate that the standard concepts of  
economic sociology_the european electronic newsletter   Volume 8, Number 3 (July 2007) Read and Recommended  46
Read and Recommended 
Olivier Godechot 
CNRS, Centre Maurice Halbwachs 
Ecole Normale Supérieure 
Paris, France 
Olivier<dot>Godechot<at>ens<dot>fr 
Roth, Louise Marie, 2006: Selling Women Short: Gen-
der Inequality on Wall Street. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
Montagne, Sabine, 2006: Les fonds de pension. Entre 
protection sociale et spéculation financière. Paris: Odile 
Jacob. 
Boltanski, Luc/ Laurent Thévenot, 2006: On justifica-
tion: Economies of Worth. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni-
versity Press. 
I would like to recommend three books that have little in 
common except two points: they were all published in 
2006, and they are all interesting for economic sociol-
ogy. 
Some books are good books of economic sociology, or 
in this case sociology of finance, without knowing it. 
Selling Women Short, by Louise Marie Roth is mainly 
inspired by gender studies. Nevertheless it is very inter-
esting for economic sociologists looking for detailed 
fieldwork on the world of finance. Unlike many contribu-
tions that focus on material or immaterial actors – theo-
ries, markets, screens –, Louise Marie Roth does not 
forget that there are also human actors at work in fi-
nance, of both genders: (mostly) men and (a few) 
women. She studies a well-known fact that has so far 
received little academic attention: the importance of pay 
discrepancy between men and women in finance. There-
fore, she conducted in-depth interviews with 75 gradu-
ates from the best MBA programs in the US working in 
1997 in major banks on Wall Street. This simple and 
clever method enables her to show the importance of pay 
discrepancy in a very homogenous population: women 
get 40% less. The interviews emphasize some of the 
mechanisms that lead to such inequalities. In a work 
marked by the importance of selective matching both 
within teams and with clients, minorities – like women – 
will only be able to match with second class colleagues 
and second class clients and will get a smaller share of 
profits once bonuses are distributed. Therefore, this 
analysis stresses also the importance of social capital in 
financial labor markets (see also Godechot, 2007). 
Despite a title which is not very fancy (thanks to the 
publisher), Sabine Montagne’s book, Les fonds de pen-
sion (i.e. Pension Funds), is not just another textbook on 
the financial industry. “The feudal and anti-liberal origin 
of finance – a genealogy of the pension industry” would 
have been a much better title for this very novel work, 
since it is really a genealogy in a Foucaultian sense. This 
history of the American pension industry is based on an 
analysis of law and jurisprudence. Pension industry is 
mainly based on trusts, a judiciary form that was in-
vented in the Middle Ages in order for a settler to bind a 
trustee to manage a property (like a fief) for the benefit 
of a beneficiary, generally a minor beneficiary. In this 
type of contract, the different parties are not equally 
capable of defending their rights, since one is a minor, 
and the other is granted a great power on a property 
that is not his/hers. As the minor can not defend his/her 
right, it is the role of the institution (first the church, and 
after the state) to defend the minor’s right in Equity courts 
rather than in Common Law Courts. It is precisely this 
type of judiciary form that at the beginning of the twenti-
eth century American firms used in order to fund pensions 
for their employees, considered ipso facto as minor bene-
ficiaries. This potentially unbound power granted to the 
trustees (pension funds) led the State to intervene in a 
direction that certainly weakened the trustee’s power but 
also that of the employees. In order to defend the latter 
against the embezzlement of the trustee, jurisprudence 
ordered pension funds to follow very precisely the best 
practices in financial industry, that is the maximizing of 
shareholder value. Alternative ways of managing funds 
are therefore forbidden: for instance the ones that 
would take into account social indicators such as em-
ployment. This is how, Sabine Montagne explains, 
American finance, thanks to this very feudal contract 
and the power of the pension industry, succeeded in 
enclosing itself on its own terms. 
Twenty years after it was first published1, Luc Boltanski 
and Laurent Thévenot’s very famous book, De la justifi-
cation, was finally translated into English and published 
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Endnotes  in 2006. The delay of the English translation was appar-
ently due to a first faulty translation. Since I have not 
read the English translation, I will take the liberty of 
recommending the book on the basis of the French 
edition (1991). This book has been at the origin of nu-
merous works and debates in French sociology. In a 
sense, it is also an economic sociology book as it rests on 
the analysis of management textbooks. It studies the 
moral structure of the arguments used to justify posi-
tions, agreements or disagreements. The Cités are differ-
ent repertories of argumentation that are available for 
anybody who tries to justify his/ her actions. The plurality 
of Cités (domestic, industrial, inspired, civic, market and 
opinion Cités) produces a plurality of spheres of justice, 
as in Walzer (1983), based on different forms of worth 
that are difficult to conciliate. If agreement is possible 
between two types of justification based on two differ-
ent types of Cités, it will always remain precarious, at the 
mercy of a criticism of one worth oriented toward the 
other worth. In the mid 1980s, Boltanski and Thevenot’s 
Justification was seen as revealing of the “return of the 
actor”, as a pragmatic shift of French sociology against 
the social deterministic and structuralist Durkheim-
Bourdieu tradition and finally as a way of reintroducing 
“freedom” in the cold sociological world. However, I 
would claim that Boltanski and Thevenot’s book is also 
very much inspired by structuralism and is in a sense 
structuralist. It is not a social-structuralist opus like 
Bourdieu’s Distinction (1979), but it is an application to 
moral justification of the textual structuralism built in the 
1960s by authors like Roland Barthes, Julien Greimas or 
even Michel Foucault. I would even say that contrary to 
its anti-deterministic claim, it contains a deterministic 
epistemology. Elaborating a grammar of morality means 
that structural forms produce some kind of determina-
tion: only some combinations of elements are possible, 
others, improper or even monstrous, are impossible (like 
the good example of a monster given on p. 278 (1991): 
distributing political tracts – civic world – at the door of 
one’s grand-mother – domestic world). It is true that 
Boltanski and Thévenot’s work could be seen as a new 
form of idealism. First, the symbolic structure of morality 
becomes a very important feature of the social. Second, 
there is sometimes a shift from the descriptive analysis 
towards a more normative position: it is not just what 
the structure of morality is but also, on occasion, what it 
should be. Whatever one can finally think of the fruitful-
ness of Boltanski and Thevenot’s approach for empirical 
sociology2, their grand book has a great virtue: it is very 
stimulating. 
1 A first version was published under the name Les èconomies 
de la grandeur in 1987. A much revised form, De la justifica-
tion, was published in 1991. 
2 One can find, for instance, interesting uses of such ideas for 
economic sociology in Façons de recruter by Eymard-Duvernay/ 
Marchal (1997) which focuses on the different types of judg-
ment used by head-hunters in the hiring process. 
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Book reviews
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Reviewer: Richard Deeg, Temple University, Philadelphia, 
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This is an ambitious and successful effort to document and 
theorize the rapid expansion of actors and institutions 
operating across national borders. The authors adopt the 
concept of “transnational governance” (TNG) to encapsu-
late this evolving world order. They argue that TNG exhib-
its several distinctive characteristics. 
First, TNG is characterized by the changing role and nature 
of actors. States are still very important, but they are being 
transformed and increasingly embedded in transnational 
networks of actors with whom they increasingly share trans-
national rule-making. The second set of important actors 
includes conventional international organizations. The 
volume, however, generally focuses on two other sets of 
increasingly prominent actors; “reinvented old actors” 
such as firms, universities, the media, and professions, 
which used to be rule-takers but are increasingly also rule-
makers. “New actors” include NGOs, standards or experts 
organizations, and “transnational communities of inter-
est,” i.e., networks of actors with a common interest in a 
governance issue and in producing transnational regulation 
around that issue. 
Second, transnational regulation is overwhelmingly in the 
form of soft law or ‘soft rules’ such as standards, guide-
lines, and norms. The informal character of such rules, and 
their general lack of statutory authority, means that com-
pliance relies more on self-reporting and monitoring, so-
cialization, acculturation, and normative pressures. In many 
instances there are more direct material incentives for 
compliance, such as access to membership and resources 
(e.g., professional associations) or certification (e.g., educa-
tion). In general, the authors find that rule-making is ex-
ploding everywhere along with monitoring, evaluating, 
and auditing activities. 
Third, network forms of organization are commonplace 
and increasingly important in constituting TNG. Networks 
typically form as new governance issues arise and actors 
recognize that their aims may be furthered through the 
creation of transnational regulation. Networks of actors are 
critically formed and guided through discursive practices 
that develop, over time, a common ground and identity 
among actors in the network – in this sense they are 
“communities of interest.” In their concluding chapter, 
Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson argue that such networks have 
a self-expanding logic as actors tend to broaden the issue 
range of concern and new actors join the network as its 
impact grows. 
To frame the book as a whole, the editors use an ex-
panded conception of ‘field’ to capture the multi-layered, 
multi-level character of transnational governance. Fields of 
transnational governance are complex combinations of 
spatial, relational, and meaning dimensions. The spatial 
dimensions in TNG are complex and not always associated 
with political or geographic boundaries; they are de-
centered, multi-centered, and multi-layered. There is often 
no clear distinction between where governance is made 
and where it applies, i.e., rule-makers and rule-takers are 
often the same actors. The relational dimension captures 
the central role of networks and communities of interest in 
TNG. Finally, the meaning dimension captures the cultural 
and institutional forces that mostly operate in the back-
ground, but shape and structure patterns of behavior and 
interaction. The meaning dimension receives considerable 
attention in the book. It is constituted by five institutional 
forces that together structure fields and create a transna-
tional culture or meaning system. These forces include 
scientization, marketization, moral rationalization, formal 
organizing, and discursive democracy. Scientization is the 
growing invocation and reliance on scientific methods and 
expertise to lend legitimacy to transnational regulations.   
Its advantage lies in its apparent value neutrality. Marketi-
zation captures the increased adoption of market mecha-
nisms and values across all fields of governance. It is a 
force aided and abetted by scientization. Organizing actors 
– often organizations – into formal transnational organiza-
tions is a cornerstone of transnational governance and 
especially well-suited to standardization and socialization 
processes. Moral rationalization is the celebration of virtue 
and virtuosity, notably via ritualized performance displays 
such as world competitions, awards, etc. Finally, transna-
tional governance is guided by the practice and belief in 
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deliberative forms of democracy in which dialogue, delib-
eration and autonomy of actors produce soft regulations. 
Altogether the spatial, relational, and meaning dimensions 
constitute actors, interests, relations and meanings. They 
become the taken-for-granted, meta-rules of the game 
that foster a transnational governance culture relying heav-
ily on soft rules with voluntary compliance. Importantly, 
such rules leave considerable scope for local editing and 
adaptation. 
The book is divided into three main parts. Each of the five 
chapters in part one focuses on one of the five institutional 
forces that constitute the meaning dimension. These chap-
ters are generally quite successful in developing each con-
cept but also in discussing concrete examples. Each chap-
ter in part two focuses on a different primary actor (and 
their networks). These include law firms, multinational 
corporations (in regard to corporate governance regula-
tion), central bankers, states, and universities. The final 
part of the book centers on the processes of TNG. These 
chapters provide historical accounts of the emergence and 
evolution of TNG in various sectors or policy domains such 
as accounting, anti-trust regulation, forestry, carbon emis-
sions trading, and management education. Empirically 
these are some of the richest chapters in the volume and 
provide valuable illustrations of the general theoretical 
arguments laid out by the editors. 
In the final chapter the editors return to the issue of what 
all this transnational regulation adds up to. First, they find a 
strong “governance spiral” driven by distrust, questions of 
responsibility, and the search for control. Ever-expanding 
regulation, shaped by the five institutional forces, creates a 
powerful underlying order out of what appears to be a 
chaotic set of transnational regulations and actors. Ulti-
mately these forces foster convergence in regulation and 
the homogenization of actors. This process of “consequen-
tial incrementalism” is long-term, complex, and not uni-
linear, but it is leading to a world culture and society with 
all-encompassing governance (but no world state). 
While the book makes a compelling and theoretical case for 
the expanded and expansive nature of transnational govern-
ance, the powerful teleology portrayed here deserves some 
questioning: The most important is to remember history – 
globalization in the 19th century was undone in the early 
20th, and it can happen again. How, of course, is often 
hard to foresee at the moment. One answer lies in the 
domestic politics of nation-states. The importance of study-
ing the interaction between national politics and institu-
tions and transnational politics and institutions is alluded 
to, but rarely figures into analyses in the book. As the 
editors suggest, analyzing this interaction is a crucial next 
step for the literature and one, I would add, that would 
benefit from cross-fertilization with intergovernmentalist 
and constructivist theory in international relations. 
 
Book: Möllering, Guido, 2006: Trust: Reason, Routine, Re-
flexivity. Oxford: Elsevier. 
Reviewer: Sabine T. Koeszegi, University of Vienna,  
Sabine.Koeszegi@UniVie.ac.at  
Guido Möllering presents a comprehensive work on trust 
as conceptualized in modern economic, sociological and 
management theory. He starts the analysis from the ra-
tional choice perspective and continually enriches the con-
cept with perspectives from sociology and psychology. 
Eventually, he integrates the different strands into one 
holistic model of trust and expands it with Georg Simmel’s 
idea of “suspension”. The result of this effort is an integra-
tive framework, what he calls the “wheel of trust”. In the 
remaining chapters of the book, Guido Möllering discusses 
different empirical approaches and advocates qualitative 
research methods to obtain richer insights into the com-
plex phenomenon. Subsequently, he presents three ex-
ploratory cases of buyer-supplier relations in the UK’s print-
ing industry and finally describes avenues for further trust 
research. 
In more detail, Guido Möllering is pointedly revealing the 
different positions of the three main perspectives viewing 
either reason, routine or reflexivity as bases for trust. In the 
rational choice perspective, he argues, trust is conceptual-
ized in the trust game and basically framed as a positive 
expectation of actors that their cooperative moves will not 
be exploited by the trustees. Guido Möllering criticizes that 
if trust is explained strictly in this calculative way (Reason), 
it is “explained away” (p. 4). He then extends the discus-
sion with the ideas of sociological theories emphasizing 
that institutions and taken-for-granted routines build the 
fundaments of trust. In essence, Guido Möllering claims 
that institutions may promote or substitute trust (Routine) 
but they cannot explain the phenomenon of trust itself. It 
is how actors deal with the uncertainty and vulnerability 
which is at the core of trust, he argues. Finally, Guido 
Möllering refers to the literature taking a process perspec-
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tive by suggesting that trust is developing gradually over 
time (Reflexivity). Again, the basic criticism of the author is 
that this perspective “misses the point” (p. 106) by ignor-
ing that uncertainty and vulnerability are still in place, even 
if actors establish a relationship over time. But what is the 
point according to Guido Möllering? “Quite simply,” he 
argues “that at the heart of the concept of trust is the 
suspension of vulnerability and uncertainty (the leap of 
faith), which enables actors to have positive expectations 
of others” (p. 191). Trusting humans interact “as if igno-
rance, doubts and dangers that exist alongside knowledge, 
convictions and assurances are unproblematic and can be 
set aside” (p. 115). There is, according to Guido Möllering 
a notion of “just do it” in trust and a “will to believe”. As 
a particularly helpful evidence of this suspension, Guido 
Möllering refers to examples of trust in the context of 
medical care, where patients for instance ignore the risks 
incurred by surgeries due to medical malpractices by trust-
ing their surgeons. By achieving this suspension “patients 
can be less terrified and undergo life-threatening brain 
surgery in a trustful, optimistic way” (p. 122). 
Trust: Reason, Routine, Reflexivity highlights the powerful 
role of trust in society. In the following, however, I want to 
reflect on some aspects of trust, which have remained in the 
shadow of Möllering’s analysis by revealing implicit (and 
ideological) assumptions suppressing alternative points of 
view. 
With his framework, Guido Möllering claims to explain the 
phenomenon trust in general. Irrespective of the identity of 
the affected persons and of the context in which trust 
becomes relevant, Guido Möllering suggests that there 
exists one true theory, capable of fully explaining the very 
personal and intimate experience of trust. In doing so he 
follows a “grand narrative” of modern theory which has 
been criticized strongly by Lyotard in “The Postmodern 
Condition” in 1979. I want to challenge Guido Möllering’s 
general claim. 
Guido Möllering implicitly reduces trust to its instrumental 
value by defining trust as a psychological state that “en-
ables actors to have positive expectations about others”. 
Statements like “Unless we are able to say what makes 
trust so unique – and powerful – we run the risk of turning 
it into an obsolete or meaningless category that is easily 
dismissed as helpless or hypocritical rhetoric” (p. 191) 
underline that trust has to be “powerful” in order to be 
meaningful. What he neglects with this argument is that 
trust also has an intrinsic value (see e.g. Weinstock, 1999). 
Being authentic, true and open, bereft of any egoistic 
motives when encountering others, we can express our 
respect simply as humans. In these moments, we trust 
without intending to reach something. Trust with its intrin-
sic value cannot lose its meaningfulness when it has no 
purpose or when it is not “enabling” actors to do some-
thing. But the questions arise, when is it important to put 
the instrumental value on the front? What is trust instru-
mental for? When is trust rendered helpless? When is trust 
a “powerful” concept? And for whom is it powerful? Most 
of the examples Guido Möllering cites throughout the 
book are drawn from a business context except for the 
ones in the medical context mentioned earlier. A person 
trusting somebody else makes a “leap of faith” over a 
“gap” to reach positive expectations. Especially in the 
economic context, scholars have claimed that trust is a 
“powerful” concept because it allows economic actors to 
take social risks. Thus, trust becomes necessary only if 
opportunism is the prevalent goal of an actor or a preva-
lent motive in the specific context. Guido Möllering is not 
making this point explicit but he puts “vulnerability and 
uncertainty” at the core of his trust definition. While 
economists are very clear and open about their basic as-
sumptions of humans (rationality, self-interest, utility maxi-
misation and opportunism) Guido Möllering’s assumptions 
remain implicit but seem not to differ in essence from those 
of the economists he is criticizing so harshly. According to 
him, trust is a powerful mechanism because it is instru-
mental for reaching [economic] goals without addressing 
the dis-functionality of trust. He never asks the question: 
When should humans not put themselves willingly into a 
position of vulnerability and possible exploitation? Trust 
definitely puts the trustee into a better position whereby it 
remains uncertain – here I absolutely agree with Guido 
Möllering – if the trusting person will benefit from trust. 
Take the examples in the context of medical care which are 
referred to as “resonating particularly well” (p.122) with 
the notion of the leap of faith. In recent years, there have 
been numerous examples in the media where less trust in 
medical care systems would have been beneficial for the 
patients. I do not want to say that people should have less 
trust in their doctors. Instead I want to make the point that 
restricting the discussion to the positive consequences of 
trust (a) neglects the “shadows” of trusting and (b) sup-
presses the role trust plays in asymmetrical power relations. 
Finally, I want to turn to another issue which is frequently 
discussed in the post-modern literature. Although stressing 
the importance of reflecting the reflexivity of the research-
ers’ work (p. 154) and that trust “requires rich interpreta-
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tion by actors and observers in order to arrive at under-
standing” (p. 156), Guido Möllering neglects in his text a 
fundamental social category distinguishing between male 
and female. I was surprised to find the entire book written 
in a completely gender-insensitive manner. By using only 
male pronouns and designations, Guido Möllering not only 
explicitly excludes women from his considerations but 
implicitly also assumes that trust research is not gendered. I 
doubt that such essential experiences as trust can be un-
derstood without the means of ethnographic research 
giving room to so far silenced voices. 
In conclusion, I think that Trust: Reason, Routine, Reflexiv-
ity offers the reader a well-written, comprehensive sum-
mary of the current state of trust research. Furthermore, it 
introduces a helpful framework to understand three differ-
ent perspectives on trust. Especially readers from the man-
agement and economic background will find in this book 
interesting insights for the management practice. How-
ever, scholars looking for a critical or even a groundbreak-
ing perspective on trust may want to search further. 
 
Book: Florian, Michael/ Frank Hillebrandt (eds.), 2006: 
Pierre Bourdieu: Neue Perspektiven für die Soziologie der 
Wirtschaft. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. 
Reviewer: Cornelius F. Moriz, University of Freiburg im 
Breisgau, c.f.moriz@web.de  
The focus of the anthology published by Florian & Hille-
brandt is the question about what perspectives Pierre 
Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice offers for the new economic 
sociology, which is heavily influenced by network analysis. 
This new economic sociology claims to make an original, 
genuinely sociological contribution to the explanation of 
economical key issues, e.g. the formation of economic 
institutions or the dynamics of markets – in contrast to the 
older economic sociology that, under the aegis of Parsons 
& Smelser (Economy and Society, 1956), aimed at the 
integration of economic issues into their own social theory. 
The central and quite plausible argument of the newer 
approaches is that economic phenomena like other social 
phenomena are formed by socio-cultural factors, and 
therefore could by no means be explained only from the 
reductive logic of economical efficiency and the individual 
maximization of benefit, as the neo-classical economic 
theory is known to suggest. In this context the editors of 
the anthology specify that the aim of the volume is to 
explicate to what extent the economic-sociological work of 
Bourdieu contributes to an expansion of horizons beyond 
the approaches of network analysis (pp. 7-18). 
To clearly establish the link to Bourdieu’s research, the 
different essays are preceded by an empirical examination 
carried out by Bourdieu in the context of his studies of the 
real estate market, in this anthology for the first time pub-
lished in German. In this examination Bourdieu takes the 
example of the construction industries to make clear, how 
economic processes are regulated by bureaucratic statutory 
orders. It's very interesting that the civil servants, who 
watch over the keeping of rules, definitely have a certain 
scope at their disposal for concrete interpretation of these 
rules and granting of exceptions, as Bourdieu documents 
with interviews; and the use of this scope depends again 
on the subjective attitudes and dispositions bundled in the 
individual “habitus”, which the responsible officials have 
acquired in the course of their socialisation. With this 
Bourdieu clearly illustrates, that the economic practice is 
influenced to a high degree by non-economic factors (as 
for example the differing individual willingness of officials 
of the building and construction authority to grant excep-
tions). Because of this an appropriate analysis of economic 
conduct must include, beside the genuine economic cate-
gories, also the necessary social, cultural and political-legal 
aspects (Pierre Bourdieu: “Das Recht und die Umgehung 
des Rechts,” pp.19-41). 
Bourdieu’s study is followed by eight essays, of which I will 
mention here those of Michael Florian and Frank Hille-
brandt, which are entirely worth reading, as well as that of 
Jürgen Mackert, whose – not really convincing – criticism 
of Bourdieu’s political statements on the spread of neo-
liberalism shouldn’t remain without remark. 
In his article Florian compares Mark Granovetter’s ap-
proach of the social embeddedness of economic phenom-
ena, established in the new economic sociology since the 
1980s, with Bourdieu’s theory of the social field. He 
reaches the conclusion that both approaches complement 
one another. Since Granovetter predominantly concen-
trates on the situational constraints and institutional re-
strictions on the economic freedom of decision-making, 
resulting from constant embedding of economic conduct 
in social networks made of personal relationships, he ne-
glects – according to Florian’s justifiable criticism – those 
macrosocial fieldstructures, which, according to Bourdieu, 
ensue from the unequal provisions of economic, cultural 
and social capital, and which find expression in the differ-
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ing proportions of power and chances of action for the 
economic protagonists. On the other hand, as writes 
Florian, Bourdieu in his analysis underestimates the struc-
ture-forming power of social networks on micro- and 
mesosocial level. Against this background Florian’s recom-
mendation that both theory approaches with regard to the 
economic-sociological question of the social integration of 
economical practice should be combined, seems worth-
while (Michael Florian: “Ökonomie als soziale Praxis,” 
pp.73-108). 
Frank Hillebrandt, for his part, starts with an observation 
that the network-analyzing approaches in the newer eco-
nomic sociology ask only if, but not how social networks 
develop in the economy. However, addressing the latter 
issue cannot be evaded by the economic-sociological re-
search for long. Hillebrandt himself links the development 
of cooperative networks to the mechanism of non-
equivalent, symbolic gift exchange. For instance, studies of 
the social development of structures in the transport busi-
ness had shown that cooperations relevant for competition 
on the market develop from the already existing relations 
of personal trust, which in turn arose from mutual ex-
change of material or immaterial gifts. The reason why this 
point is often overlooked by the economic-sociological 
research lies in the identification of exchange in modern 
economy mostly exclusively with the rational, money-
conveying exchange of equivalents. This leads to a mis-
taken assumption that gift exchange is irrelevant. 
Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice could now help to resolve 
that problem. Since it does not try to explain the economic 
practice alone with the supposed non-historical logic of 
economic efficiency and individual maximization of benefit, 
but considers also the socio-cultural base of modern econ-
omy, Bourdieu’s theory is apt to include not only the ex-
change of merchandise but also that of gifts or symbolic 
gestures as basic network structures generating practice-
forms of the economy. To sum up, Hillebrandt’s exposi-
tions are quite clear on the theoretic level, but the reader 
would wish to get more specific information about the 
kind of gifts being exchanged (Frank Hillebrandt: “Der 
Tausch als strukturbildende Praxisform,” pp.147-168). 
Jürgen Mackert deals in his article with Bourdieu’s criticism 
of neo-liberalism. Mackert rejects among other things 
Bourdieu’s two theses that (1) the state retires more and 
more from its social duties in the course or the accom-
plishment of the neo-liberalism, and as a result (2) the 
West European welfare state will be substituted by the 
American model. Mackert’s reasons for rejecting these 
claims are the following. First, even today and even in a 
liberal market economy numerous and undeniable func-
tions are in store for the state. Second, the conditions for 
political actions in the coordinated “Rhenish” and the 
liberal “Anglo-Saxon” capitalism are so different from each 
other that it would be quite impossible to speak of “ho-
mogenization” or “Americanization”. Nevertheless, con-
sidering that Bourdieu does not at all maintain a general 
retreat of the state, but only primarily from welfare duties, 
and from the regulation of the economy (comp. e.g. 
Bourdieu 1998), then in my opinion his assertion cannot be 
dismissed in view of the evident cuts in social services, not 
only in Germany, as well as the liberalization of the job-
market, the privatization of the pension-system and so on. 
And if one discerns in these “reforms” an outstanding sign 
of the American model, Bourdieu’s theory of “homogeni-
zation” appears very reasonable. In this respect Mackert’s 
criticism of Bourdieu is not convincing (Jürgen Mackert: 
“Die Macht des Neoliberalismus und das Schicksal des 
Staates,“ pp.196-220). 
In the end, I want to also mention a quite informative 
article of Rainer Diaz-Bone, who goes over the great influ-
ence of Bourdieu on the French sociology, as well as the 
joint article of Ute Volkmann and Uwe Schimank, where 
both writers reveal the possibility of a link between 
Bourdieu’s theory and the theory of social differentiation 
of Niklas Luhmann, giving an effective summary of, in my 
opinion, plausible reasons for Bourdieu’s claims about the 
dominance of economy in modern society (Rainer Diaz-
Bone: “Wirtschaftssoziologische Perspektiven nach Bourdieu 
in Frankreich,” pp.43-71; Ute Volkmann/ Uwe Schimank: 
“Kapitalistische Gesellschaft,” pp. 221-242). 
All in all, I consider the anthology of Florian and Hille-
brandt a good lead-in to the economic sociology of 
Bourdieu. While the collection in itself is not very innova-
tive, it is definitely a very welcome addition to the literature 
that will help disseminate Pierre Bourdieu’s economic-
social thinking to the German-speaking audience. 
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Book: Whitford, Josh, 2005: The New Old Economy: Net-
works, Institutions, and the Organizational Transformation 
of American Manufacturing. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Reviewer: Andrew Schrank, University of New Mexico, 
schrank@unm.edu  
Josh Whitford’s The New Old Economy explores the nature 
and growth of collaborative relationships between “origi-
nal equipment manufacturers” (OEMs) of durable goods 
(e.g., automobiles and transportation equipment, machine 
tools, appliances) and their component suppliers in the 
American Upper Midwest. The book makes three invalu-
able contributions to economic sociology and organization 
studies: first, it treats “contradictory collaboration” as an 
increasingly common – and in all likelihood coherent – 
alternative to either arm’s length or embedded buyer-
supplier relationships; second, it traces the growth of con-
tradictory collaboration not only to the institutional charac-
teristics of the so-called liberal market economy but to the 
organizational features of the OEMs themselves; and, fi-
nally, it offers policymakers, businesspeople, and trade 
unionists who hope to catalyze a more productive ap-
proach to collaboration practical policy advice. 
Whitford departs from the devastating crisis of American 
durable goods production in the late twentieth century. 
Over the last quarter of a century the United States econ-
omy has lost more than 6 million manufacturing jobs, and 
Midwestern states like Michigan, Illinois, Indiana, and Wis-
consin have been particularly hard hit. While original 
equipment manufacturers like Ford, Caterpillar, and Gen-
eral Electric have embraced the gospel of “lean and mean” 
in an effort to forestall the crisis, and have therefore de-
centralized (or “outsourced”) production to an army of 
component suppliers, they have encountered a host of 
problems in doing so including skill and reliability deficits 
on the part of the very suppliers to whom they’ve turned 
for help. OEMs are the principal sources of productive 
knowledge and resources, however, and their suppliers 
therefore find themselves in a double bind. On the one 
hand, their ability to attract and retain business from the 
OEMs depends upon their ability to overcome their skill 
and reliability deficits. On the other hand, their ability to 
overcome their skill and reliability deficits depends upon 
their ability to attract and retain the business of OEMs. 
What is to be done? Whitford addressed the question by 
carrying out more than 100 interviews with OEMs and 
their component suppliers in Illinois and Wisconsin in 2002 
and 2003 and responds by way of a running dialogue with 
the two leading approaches to the question: the Varieties 
of Capitalism approach pioneered by Peter Hall and David 
Soskice and the Learning by Monitoring approach associ-
ated with Charles Sabel and his collaborators. While Hall 
and Soskice portray decentralized production in industries 
marked by “incremental innovation” as incompatible with 
the incentives provided by the liberal market economy, and 
therefore anticipate the ongoing decline of durable manu-
facturing in the US, Sabel treats trust and supplier compe-
tence as incremental products of collaborative relation-
ships, and therefore anticipates more salutary conse-
quences. 
Neither Hall and Soskice nor Sabel is able to account for 
the complexity of decentralized durable manufacturing in 
the Upper Midwest, however, and Whitford is therefore 
forced to condition – if by no means condemn – their con-
clusions. After all, Hall and Soskice are unable to make 
sense of the myriad examples of buyer-supplier collabora-
tion revealed by Whitford’s many interviews. And Sabel 
and his colleagues are unable to explain the persistence of 
hedging, deception, and guile within what are by almost 
any metric collaborative – and at times longstanding – 
relationships. In fact, Whitford finds “that the modal case 
of the OEM-supplier relationship is both contradictory and 
systematically intermediate between the arm’s length and 
collaborative poles” (p. 31) and thereby introduces a new 
concept, contradictory collaboration, into the industry 
studies lexicon. 
What are the principal characteristics of contradictory col-
laboration? On the one hand, OEMs help their suppliers 
meet their performance standards (e.g., cost, quality, and 
delivery) by communicating openly about the production 
process. Suppliers open their doors (and books) to OEM 
consultants and purchasing agents, and OEMs open their 
doors to supplier engineers in what Whitford memorably 
labels a “waltz” of “mutual adjustment.” On the other 
hand, OEMs and in particular their suppliers take precau-
tions (i.e., hedge) in light of the potential for mistrust, 
miscommunication, and opportunism on the part of their 
interlocutors. They “muddy the waters” (p. 103) with mis-
leading or even deceptive cost information. They withhold 
cost savings at time 1 in order to meet new cost targets at 
time t + 1. And they at times forego “offers of concrete 
assistance from their customers for fear of compromising 
information” (p. 104). 
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and the rewards include promotions that inhibit the growth 
of enduring relationships that might otherwise facilitate the 
emergence of less contradictory forms of collaboration. 
The point is not simply that collaboration is contradictory 
but that the contradictions are costly. They not only under-
cut the benefits of decentralized production in the short 
run but threaten to turn the “virtuous circle” described by 
Sabel into a “vicious circle” in the long run. “Faced with 
bad waltzing and organizational uncertainty,” argues 
Whitford, “suppliers have good reason for caution in the 
sharing of process information and of investing in new 
product development on the promise of business down the 
line. Yet this gives OEMs greater reason to treat particular 
subcomponents as commodities and emboldens marketeer 
factions within OEMs who believe that the best way to 
lower costs is to jump from underbidding supplier to un-
derbidding supplier to take advantage of excess capacity in 
global markets” (p. 119). The likely consequences include 
lower supplier margins, limited investment in fixed and 
human capital, deteriorating buyer-supplier relationships, 
and the ongoing evaporation of high wage manufacturing 
in the Upper Midwest. 
In short, Whitford treats interorganizational conflict as a 
function of intraorganizational structure and thereby brings 
key insights from classical organizational sociology to bear 
on an important process – contradictory collaboration – left 
unexamined by the new economic sociology. While Whit-
ford’s theoretical synthesis is long overdue, and is most 
certainly not to be minimized, his practical contributions 
are no less important. After all, Whitford concludes the 
book by documenting the growth of local and regional 
partnerships designed to foster coordinated activity in the 
otherwise liberal American market economy. According to 
Whitford, the Wisconsin Manufacturers’ Development 
Consortium (WMDC) constitutes a prototypical example.   
By drawing seven large OEMs and dozens of component 
suppliers together with the aid of private funds and state-
level industrial extension resources, he argues, the WMDC 
not only facilitates supplier training but underwrites the 
sorts of credible commitment to collaboration necessary to 
foster more enduring forms of learning by monitoring. 
What accounts for the incomplete nature of decentralized 
durable goods production in the United States? While the 
contradictions Whitford has identified are at least in part 
the product of institutions and incentives found in all lib-
eral market economies (e.g., antitrust regulations that 
inhibit coordination, labor laws that decentralize or disable 
collective bargaining, a litigious approach to dispute reso-
lution, etc.), and therefore add credibility to Hall and 
Soskice’s account, they are no less attributable to the or-
ganizational design of the OEMs themselves. After all, 
OEMs are not only plagued by the divisions and dysfunc-
tions found in all multidivisional enterprises, including the 
at times incompatible goals of their purchasing and manu-
facturing divisions, but are deliberately designed to fore-
stall – rather than foster – the growth of personal relation-
ships between purchasing agents and suppliers that could 
admittedly encourage collaboration but could no less easily 
promote malfeasance. Purchasing agents are rewarded for 
short run cost savings regardless of their long term impact,  
The point is not that regional partnerships are a cure-all for 
what ails American durable manufacturing. On the con-
trary, they are a small and politically embattled counter-
weight to the often perverse incentives engendered by the 
liberal market economy. But they have nonetheless re-
ceived a triply important fillip from Whitford’s research. 
First, Whitford has worked directly with the WMDC – and 
related institutions – to document and maximize their 
efficacy (p. 190, footnote 103) and his book will only fur-
ther their efforts. Second, the WMDC serves as a model for 
regional programs elsewhere in the US (p. 146) and thereby 
disseminates policy recommendations developed in part 
through Whitford’s research. And, finally, Whitford’s book 
draws attention to (and legitimates) the WMDC’s efforts 
and thereby encourages further and more successful repli-
cation down the road. 
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Ph.D. Projects in Economic Sociology 
Content, Structure, and Performance Implications of 
Board Interlocks: The Role of Institutional Contingencies 
Institution: Marshall School of Business, University of 
Southern California 
Author: Ilya Okhmatovskiy (ilya.okhmatovskiy@mcgill.ca ) 
Current Affiliation: Desautels Faculty of Management, 
McGill University, Canada 
My dissertation examines antecedents and consequences 
of board interlocks. The focus of the analysis is on the 
moderating effects of institutional factors. By bringing the 
institutional perspective into the analysis of intercorporate 
ties I explain some of the inconsistent results of prior stud-
ies by showing how, under different institutional condi-
tions, similar intercorporate ties are used differently and 
have different performance implications. 
The dissertation consists of three separate but related stud-
ies. In all three studies I use data on board interlocks that I 
have collected for a large sample of banks and industrial 
companies in Russia. For cross-national comparisons I use 
data reported in prior studies of board interlocks in other 
countries. My first two studies are about institutional fac-
tors that affect how organizations use interlocks in re-
sponse to resource dependencies. In the first study about 
inter-industry and intra-industry interlocks I analyze institu-
tional factors that determine whether resource depend-
ence is associated with uncertainty and whether board 
interlocks are used to alleviate this uncertainty. In the sec-
ond study I develop and test hypotheses about the associa-
tion between banks’ dependence on different sources of 
financial capital and their positions in the network of board 
interlocks. The third study is focused on performance im-
plications of ties with different parts of the state and I 
analyze profitability and growth of banks with representa-
tives of different state organizations on their boards. To-
gether these studies demonstrate that the tendency to use 
interlocks under conditions of resource dependence as well 
as performance implications of interlocks are contingent 
on the institutional context. 
The Institutionalization of a New Financial Market: The 
Case of Socially Responsible Investments in France 
Institution: Lille 1 University, Clersé, France 
Author: Elise Penalva Icher (elise.penalva@wanadoo.fr ) 
This dissertation aims to understand the legal, political and 
social mechanisms that support the institutionalization of 
the French market for Socially Responsible Investments 
(SRI). This new kind of investments appeared, in France, by 
the late 1990’s. They aim to select assets using financial 
but also extra financial ratings. “Extra” means that ratings 
follow social, environmental or ethical criteria. French SRI 
has emerged thanks to the creation of an extra-financial 
rating agency, named Arese-Vigeo. Unlike in other coun-
tries, such as the United States, its roots are not in ethical 
responsibility. SRI in France try to manage assets in har-
mony with Sustainable Development principles. Doing so, 
actors of French SRI hope to generate new sources of per-
formance, in order to create a pension funds industry. 
Trying to invest responsibly creates high uncertainty. What 
are “responsible” investments is the main question, which 
actors must answer in order to institutionalize a new mar-
ket. This problem is related to the funds quality. To solve 
that problem of quality, SRI actors are very heterogeneous. 
They organize relationships with different types of actors 
to acquire resources. Asset managers work with Unions or 
NGO, to acquire social or environmental information and 
expertise. For example, Unions have created a committee 
for responsible Employee Savings Plans. It selects and re-
wards plans with a brand. As a consequence, there is a 
strong collegial sociability within the field. 
Because of this sociability, we created a methodology that 
uses both ethnography and social network analysis to 
study the relationships within this field. Two relationships, 
co-work and friendship, seemed crucial in the resource 
exchange and interdependency that are at stake in the 
institutionalization. Moreover, the mechanisms that con-
tribute to institutionalization can be understood through 
legal, cultural, political and also social processes. 
After highlighting those legal, cultural and political aspects, 
we have applied the social network analysis to focus on 
the social process, related to embeddedness, which shows 
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that there is a great amount of cooperation in this market. 
Nevertheless, once that market will become perennial, 
competition is expected to start and actors to claim their 
domination. Friendship makes competition possible despite 
cooperation. But, this is a social competition. It expresses 
itself with informal gates, behind the openness and free 
access to market. 
Furthermore, some financial actors have turned themselves 
into institutional entrepreneurs. They have linked with 
external actors, like Unions, and converted them to their 
quality vision of SRI. Today, SRI is about becoming main-
stream. SRI can remain a niche or export itself to main-
stream finance and turn over its ethos and techniques. 
French financial actors of SRI support the mainstream vi-
sion. Such a vision has effects on both products and actors. 
It is a regulatory process. From this new position in the 
networks, financial actors take this business away from the 
extra financial rating agencies. On the other hand, Unions 
are able to have a voice in the debate on pensions capitali-
zation. 
This study has two-fold implications for economic sociol-
ogy. First, it helps to understand some meanings of Corpo-
rate Social Responsibility by examining the French case. 
Here, social responsibility is related to a technical process 
to generate performance. It aims to reach deep into the 
economy and might be the new sense that capitalism 
needs. Second, the case study of the French SRI market 
can show how a new market institutionalizes, by first 
postponing economic competition and substituting it with 
cooperation. This cooperation fulfills common interest: the 
market survival. But, thanks to other relationships, like 
friendship, competition can emerge. Those personal ties 
give competitive advantages that will take hold the day the 
market will be fully institutionalized. It respects actors’ 
personal interests: the future domination of a new eco-
nomic field. 
 
Marketing Technologies: An Ethnographic Study of 
the Performative Properties of Narratives and of Ac-
countability Relations in Hi-tech Marketing 
Institution: Said Business School, University of Oxford 
Author: Elena Simakova (elena.simakova@enst.fr ) 
Current affiliation: Ecole Nationale Supérieure des Télé-
communications, Paris, France 
Technology businesses are active agents of economic and 
technological change. Technology marketing is often em-
ployed by corporations as a constitutive effort in shaping 
their position in the market with anticipations to increase 
profit. My thesis critically addresses the present societal 
and scholarly concerns with the power of marketing 
knowledge to shape socio-technical relations. The thesis 
title “Marketing Technologies” reflects two mutually impli-
cated concerns: the everyday life in the hi-tech marketing 
department of a global corporation, as well as marketing 
knowledge in its practical and theoretical aspects. Inspired 
by the laboratory studies, the analysis of technology mar-
keting in practice is based on an eighteen month long 
participant observation in a marketing department of a 
global hi-tech corporation “Virtual World”. 
Focusing on language, conventions and beliefs that under-
pin marketing in practice, the thesis provides an insight in 
the everyday activities of a “vertical” marketing team busy 
with Internet-related solutions and of marketing of an 
emerging RFID – radio frequency identification – technol-
ogy. The thesis develops an approach to marketing as a 
practical activity performing and being performed in cer-
tain accountability relations. In particular, the ethnography 
discusses such questions as: how do marketers account for 
their work to others in the organisation? How can market-
ing power and marketing knowledge be understood as 
upshots of situated assessments? How do accounts of 
technology become deemed mutually credible to audi-
ences of marketers, customers, and others? 
The thesis advances our knowledge of processes providing 
for making new markets for emerging technologies. RFID 
technology (chips containing digital data and readers of 
this data) is taken as an example. The emergence of RFID is 
currently accompanied by promises of its capacity to dra-
matically change mobility patterns, and means by which 
patterns and trajectories can be made traceable. How do 
marketers go about their task to market, and to create 
markets for changing forms of mobility associated with 
RFID? The thesis shows in what sense marketing of RFID 
can be seen as the practical work of creating tellable RFID 
stories. It examines in detail how, establishing RFID as a 
point of reference inside the corporation to draw together 
resources and expertise for their own RFID project, market-
ers engaged in attempts at articulating a corporate RFID 
story to a wider set of audiences. The analysis of technol-
ogy marketing in the thesis interleaves ethnographic re-
porting and theoretical discussions. A considerable part of 
the text is devoted to methodological reflections on doing 
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ethnography in the business setting, on the constitution of 
the research field and to the analysis of day-to-day practice 
of ethnographic engagement with marketing “natives”. 
Questions of utility and value of the study receive special 
attention, as do implications for marketing strategy. 
 
From Behemoths to Subsidiaries: The Politics of Steel 
Sector Restructuring and Privatization in Central and 
Eastern Europe 
Institution: Department of Political Science, Yale University 
Author: Aleksandra Sznajder (asznajde@richmond.edu ) 
Current Affiliation: Department of Political Science, Uni-
versity of Richmond 
This dissertation proposes the theory of evolutionary state 
retrenchment as it analyzes the different trajectories of 
convergence on foreign capital-dominated liberal capital-
ism in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). The project fo-
cuses on the politics of the convergence process in the 
steel sector of four countries with most dissimilar legacies 
in the region: Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, and Slo-
vakia. It examines the interplay between domestic institu-
tions and external pressures on the one hand and the 
state-managerial-union nexus on the other. The study entails 
four distinct levels of analysis: international, national, sec-
toral, and enterprise, and relies on process-tracing to reveal 
causal mechanisms underpinning observed outcomes in this 
economically and symbolically important sector. 
The project is motivated by two puzzles encountered in the 
steel sector of the four country cases which are also the 
biggest steel producers in CEE. First, despite very different 
theoretical expectations, and indeed, divergent initial policy 
choices, the four countries converged on the same out-
come as far as ownership type is concerned: they sold their 
steel mills to strategic foreign investors (SFIs). Second, 
transition leaders, namely Poland and the Czech Republic, 
counterintuitively sold their largest steel producers to SFIs 
after Slovakia and Romania which have been regarded as 
the transition laggards. 
The argument is that the countries started the transition 
process with diverse structures of political competition, 
that is, coalitions differing in their commitment to privati-
zation and facing political opposition of varying strength. 
Acting under pressure of the opposition and vested inter-
ests in the sector, the governing coalitions attempted to 
optimize their reelection chances by balancing their pol-
icy/reform goals on the one hand and the opportunities of 
engaging in rent-seeking and patronage on the other.  The 
initial policy decisions resulted in politically-convenient 
partial reform: in privatization to domestic owners (in the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia) or in continued state owner-
ship (in Poland and Romania). Neither choice could ensure 
the sector’s long-term viability on world markets. 
These policy choices were implemented while relying on 
technocratic capacity of the states in question. Techno-
cratic capacity refers to the sum of institutional instruments 
at the disposal of state actors which they can use both to 
promote market adjustment by the enterprises and to 
intervene selectively in the market processes in order to 
obtain politically (and potentially economically) desirable 
outcomes. Policy implementation using the given level of 
state technocratic capacity produced a feedback effect, 
triggering different dominant external pressures in these 
countries (International Financial Institutions (IFIs), interna-
tional financial markets, and EU) and, in turn, leading to 
convergence on ownership by SFIs. 
Where state capacity was the lowest (Romania), the diffi-
culty of maintaining macroeconomic stability triggered IFI 
involvement and the concomitant policy constraints, result-
ing in privatization to SFIs. Where state capacity was of 
medium level (Slovakia), the state was capable of averting 
IFI involvement but could neither command sufficient fi-
nancial resources nor gain the trust of the financial actors 
operating on the international markets to maintain the 
status quo. 
Finally, in countries with relatively high level of technocratic 
capacity (Czech Republic and Poland), the state could 
command the trust of international lenders, as it brought 
about partial restructuring and developed ingenious short-
term solutions to the enterprises’ financial problems. In 
other words, higher technocratic capacity enabled political 
actors to prolong partial reform by allowing them to skirt 
those external pressures which their counterparts with 
smaller technocratic capacity succumbed to. 
In these cases, it was the EU prohibition of state aid to the 
sector in the run-up to the closure of membership negotia-
tions which eventually pushed the governments to privat-
ize to the SFIs. Therefore, country case studies illustrated 
evolutionary state retrenchment, whereby the converging 
trajectories of the individual countries were rooted in dif-
ferent domestic contexts. 
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Moving to the sectoral, and enterprise levels, the study 
examines the state-managerial-union nexus. As far as 
managerial behavior is concerned, the project proposes the 
theory of managerial prestige-maximization: even though 
the managers realized that in the medium and long run, 
the steel sector as a whole would be better off if they 
cooperated in the restructuring effort, without state-
mandated cooperation, they preferred to pursue inde-
pendent, myopic strategies. These enhanced their per-
ceived prestige, but did not build on the strengths of par-
ticular enterprises in the sector, undermining their viability 
in the medium-to-long run. 
The project also speaks strongly against policy recommen-
dations of insulating decision-makers from labor pressures.  
Rather, it shows that autonomous, encompassing sectoral 
union organizations were associated with higher intensity  
of restructuring. Moreover, the development and strength-
ening of sectoral-level social dialogue contributed to calm-
ing restructuring-related tensions. The enterprise-level 
unions generally played a watchdog function in the post-
privatization period, as they monitored the extent to which 
the new investors fulfilled their contractual obligations. 
To trace the different convergence processes in these 
countries, the research for this dissertation is based not 
only on primary materials such as government policy pa-
pers and newspaper accounts, but also on more than one 
hundred open-ended interviews conducted with the main 
actors involved in restructuring and in privatization. These 
include civil servants, former ministers, sectoral and enter-
prise-level trade union leaders, enterprise managers, sec-
toral employer and industrial association representatives, 
and consultants. 
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